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Civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social 
justice, either through organisations that play the role of “watchdog”, or through mobilisation 
by the poor themselves around their own concerns. However, civil society can reflect and 
reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices of the wider society. Sometimes it works to 
benefit a specific ethnic group or political group, and also reflects some unsatisfactory 
aspects of culture to which the constituents of civil society belong. In this study, both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses show that the associational activities and social 
movements in Cape Town reflect some kind of pathologies or injustices of the wider society. 
The qualitative analysis focuses on the ‘toilet war’, which took place throughout 2010 in 
Khayelitsha, Cape Town. It surely has an aspect of “service delivery protest”, where the poor 
and the marginalised undertake protest action to express their grievances for the improvement 
of service delivery. Nevertheless, the data shows that the “poorest of the poor” are actually 
excluded and deserted by democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, and the 
rage against the legacy of apartheid. Ironically, democratic and participatory processes of 
decision-making in the small community contribute toward ignoring the voices of the poorest 
of the poor, who are still the minority there. The partisan purpose and the rage against racism 
restrict the interest of the poorest of the poor, too. Also there is a subtle but critical 
disjuncture between the “commander” of the ‘toilet war’ and its followers, which makes it 
more difficult to ensure the civil rights of the poorest of the poor. On the other hand, the 
quantitative analysis shows that participation in associational activities and protests is not 
correlated so much to incomes and grievances. Rather, variables such as race, political 
attitudes, and psychological resources are more correlated with participation. This is 
particularly true with associational activities like being a member of community-based 
groups or attending community meetings. Cape Town has a substantial overlap amongst race, 
income and grievances, but the regression analyses indicate that race still has significant 
correlation with participation in civil society. Opposed to the general expectation for civil 
society in South Africa, participation in civil society is not always the channel for the poor to 
express their grievances. Although further research should be conducted on why black people 
are more likely to participate in civil society than other races, this study disputes the general 
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Civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social 
justice, either through organisations that play the role of “watchdog”, or through mobilisation 
by the poor themselves around their own concerns. However, civil society can reflect and 
reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices of the wider society. Sometimes it works to 
benefit a specific ethnic group or political group, and also reflects some unsatisfactory 
aspects of culture to which the constituents of civil society belong. There are some examples 
of civil society which are not necessarily working purely for the poor and the marginalised. 
This provokes a possibility that the real voices of the poor and the marginalised are ignored 
because of these pathologies and injustices. Taking as a case study the South African city of 
Cape Town, this thesis empirically examines whether some kind of pathologies and injustices 
are reflected in civil society. Are the associational activities and protest actions reflecting the 
real voices of the poor and marginalised in Cape Town? If so, how effective are they in 
influencing the policy making and implementation? If not, how are their voices ignored or 
suppressed? 
 
The term “civil society” has a broad and diverse definition so we need to conceptualise which 
specific aspects we mean by civil society in this study. Chapter 1 reviews some of the 
enormous literature about civil society in general and argues what kind of concept should be 
applied to this study. We discuss civil society in a broad context first, and then focus on the 
situations in South Africa. We also discuss the context of Cape Town and the research 
framework and methodology of this study. The pathologies and injustices which civil society 
can reflect and reproduce from the wider society are also discussed. These arguments help us 
to understand how civil society is recognised in South Africa, and to consider possible 
problems of the cases investigated in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 and 3 qualitatively analyse why people participate in associational activities and 
protests. Throughout 2010, there has been great controversy over toilets which the City of 












protest in a specific area in Khayelitsha, but escalated to the point where it developed into a 
series of  “service delivery protests”  in Khayelitsha as a whole by  the middle of November 
2010. Chapter 2 chronologically describes the details of  this  ‘toilet war’, mainly from the 
articles in the media. Based on the narrative in Chapter 2 and the fieldwork I conducted in 
Makhaza, Chapter 3 analyses the reasons why the people or organisations get involved in the 
‘toilet war’, and how decisions are made within civil society. The ‘toilet war’ is commonly 
considered to be “service delivery protest”, which is generally expected as a role of civil 
society in South Africa. However, although some stakeholders try to protect the civil rights of 
the Makhaza residents, others prevent them from doing. This case reveals one aspect of how 
the voices of the poorest of the poor are ignored and suppressed in civil society. 
 
Chapter 4 quantitatively analyses the correlates of participation in associational activities and 
protests, so that we can infer why people participate. I use the Cape Area Study (CAS) 2005, 
which was conducted by the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape 
Town in 2005, as the source of data. I examine the correlation between some possible 
motivations to participate (income, demographic backgrounds, grievances with service 
delivery, grievances relating to the neighbourhood, political attitude, attitude towards 
neighbourhood, and psychological resources) and actual participation, so as to assess the 
relative importance of these different motivations. The analyses show that the variables such 
as identities and political attitudes are more related to the participation in civil society, rather 
than the variables like incomes and grievances. This is not explicitly displaying the fact that 
civil society in Cape Town does not reflect the voices of the poor and marginalised, but at 
least we can doubt the assumption that civil society represents the interests of them. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses show that civil society in Cape Town reflects some 
pathologies or injustices of the wider society. In the case of the ‘toilet war’, the “poorest of 
the poor” are actually excluded and deserted by democracy within the community, the 
partisan purpose, and the rage against the legacy of apartheid. Also there is a subtle but 
critical disjuncture between the “commander” of the ‘toilet war’ and its followers, which 
makes it more difficult to ensure the civil rights of the poorest of the poor. On the other hand, 
the quantitative analysis shows that variables such as race, political attitudes, and 












are. This is particularly true with associational activities like being a member of community-
based groups or attending community meetings. Cape Town has a substantial overlap 
amongst race, income and grievances, but the regression analyses indicate that race still has 
significant correlation with participation in civil society. Opposed to the general expectation 
of civil society in South Africa, participation in civil society is not always the channel for the 
poor to express their grievances. This study disputes the general romantic notion of civil 

















These days we can find the term used very often in debates about governance as well as 
development, but the definition is becoming broader and broader and the concept more and 
more ambiguous. The idea of civil society appeared in conjunction with the development of 
the  “modern  state”. In various countries in Europe around A.D. 1500-1800, two main 
developments took place: firstly, the state had to detach itself from the church and became 
more powerful in its own right; secondly, the rise of powerful states produced increasingly 
“strident” claims for a measure of social autonomy and personal liberty, which had to be 
protected against the state (Atkinson, 1996:287-8). Then civil society, which mentions the 
sphere of “non-state” and “non-family” social life, was gradually produced, and it includes a 
wide array of organisations, such as scientific and literary organisations, sports clubs, private 
schools, publishers, manufacturing enterprises, and churches. In the last few decades, 
distinctly  modern  kinds  of  association  called  “non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)”, 
“community-based  organisations  (CBOs)”  and  “voluntary non-profit organisations” have 
become prominent members of civil society. Atkinson (1996) considers “the enthusiasm for 
civil  society”  to  be “a  strong  sentiment  of  ‘anti-statism’”,  that  is,  “disillusionment with 
parliamentary democracy, the welfare state, and the alienation engendered by vast 
government bureaucracies” (ibid.). For her, civil society is a means to protest against the state 
and protect people’s interest from the state. 
 
Whilst some researchers like Atkinson regard the key character of civil society as anti-statist, 
others illustrate civil society from different perspectives. Foley and Edwards (1996) make a 
distinction  between  two  broad  versions  of  the  civil  society  argument  and  call  them  “Civil 
Society  I”  and “Civil Society  II”  (Foley & Edwards, 1996:39).  “Civil Society I” places an 













“Civil Society II” puts special emphasis on civil society “as a sphere of action that is 
independent of the state and that is capable —precisely for this reason— of energizing 
resistance to a tyrannical regime”  (ibid.). From this perspective, the anti-statist approach 
towards civil society can be categorised in “Civil Society II”, which favours strong and 
independent civil society. 
 
On the other hand, De Wet (2010) employs Gramsci and seeks for the definition that is “the 
mixture of collegial and antagonistic relations” between the state and civil society (De Wet, 
2010:3). He doubts that a radical separation between the state and civil society can be made, 
and thus civil society can be seen to constitute the space “between” the state apparatus and 
individuals or families (ibid.). Pillay (1996) also sees  Gramsci’s  argument  as  useful and 
describes a different role of civil society from the anti-statist one, saying “once the working 
class  captured  state  power,  that  power would  be  bolstered  by  ‘...a  sturdy  structure  of  civil 
society’”  (Pillay,  1996:340). For them, civil society is not always anti-statist but also can 
collaborate with the state at times, and even could be a support for the state power in a certain 
situation. At this stage, civil society functions as a promoter of democracy in a democratic 
society,  which  is  referred  to  as  “Civil  Society  I”, rather  than  “resistance  to  a  tyrannical 
regime” (Foley & Edwards, 1996:39). In short, “Civil Society I” is related to stabilisation of 
democracy, whilst “Civil Society II” is primarily involved with transition to democracy. This 
approach looks at civil society in relation to democracy, and as Kaplan (1994) notes, “much 
of the debate regarding civil society centres around the relationship it should have with the 
state”, and “civil society is ‘a crucial element’ in a democratic society” (Kaplan, 1994:2). 
 
Although discussions so far more or less associate civil society with the state or democracy, 
there is yet another perspective on civil society, especially in the context of Africa. The 
Nigerian scholar Peter Ekeh asserts that civil society  “has  an  elaborate  usage  in Western 
history” and that there exists the danger “of misapplying Western political constructs to 
African circumstances” (Ekeh, 1992:188). According to him, although civil society in Africa 
is conventionally said to be weak, argument of the dynamics of civil society in Africa should 
be “without  purpose outside  its  potential  relationship with  democracy” because democracy 
itself has  “a  weak  base  in  Africa”  (Ekeh,  1992:196). He identifies two public realms in 













the latter referring to the realm “whose value-premises are moral, binding together members 
of the same natural and assumed kinship (including ethnic) groupings” (Ekeh, 1992:192-193). 
The existence of “the primordial public” in  Africa  makes  “a  dramatic  difference  between 
Europe and Africa in the conception of civil society” (Ekeh, 1992:197). One could recognise 
“a vast  array  of  institutions  and associations of  civil  society”  in Africa if  you  include “the 
primordial public” in civil society, even though it does not necessarily mean that “they will 
be useful for the rise of democracy” (ibid.). 
 
Also, Kasfir (1998) criticises  the  conventional  notion  of  civil  society  for  “being  shaped  to 
serve the goal of better governance, particularly democratic reform, rather than a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between social formations, the associations that represent 
them and the state” (Kasfir, 1998:1). He insists on necessity of expanding a concept of civil 
society  to  the one which  is “less prescriptive”, “does not  import so many Western models” 
and  “captures more  of  the  social  issues  in  which Africans  are  engaged” whether they are 
“civic or not” (Kasfir, 1998:17). Moreover, such anthropologists as Comaroff and Comaroff 
(1999), Garland (1999) and Karlstrom (1999) maintain that linking civil society only to 
“Western  democracies”  and  pointing  out  the  weakness  of  the  “Western”  civil  society  in 
Africa  are  a  false  point  of  view  derived  from  “Eurocentrism”  (Comaroff  &  Comaroff, 
1999:16-17; Endo, 2000:153; Garland, 1999; Karlstrom, 1999).  
 
Ekeh’s another contribution is division of “means” and “ends” of civil society. He sets four 
types of civil society in accordance with its means and ends (Table 1.1). He analyses the case 
of Nigeria and explains each of associations, so here I briefly summarise what each category 
refers to. “Civic  public  associations” use “resources  from  the  civic  public  realm  and  their 
general goals are to advance the welfare of the civic public or of their members functioning in 
it” (Ekeh, 1992:201). Formal NPOs fall into this category. “Deviant civic associations” also 
try to advance the welfare within the civic public realm, but enhance “their power holdings 
by employing tools and means that the state cannot control” (Ekeh, 1992:203). Some kind of 
secret society can be in there. “Primordial public associations” serve “the public interests of 
unique  primordial  (usually  ethnic)  groupings  in  Africa”  and  “exploit the resources of the 












associations” covers “a broad spectrum of organizations that seek to use their own resources, 
from an exclusive membership based on certain criteria of indigenous organisations, to secure 
their common welfare” (Ekeh, 1992:206-207). The latter two are not seeking for democracy 
as such, but incorporated in civil society in Africa. This categorisation not only diversifies 
our view on the roles of civil society, but also enables us to pay attention to the participants 
or constituents in civil society. Seeing civil society only in relation to the state or democracy 
more or less focuses on the roles of civil society, such as whether it promotes democracy or 
not, or whether it protests against the state or not. Ekeh’s categorisation can make it possible 











Beginning from the anti-statist approach towards civil society, we discuss civil society in 
relation to the state or democracy, as well as referred to the African circumstances. The anti-
statist view of civil society can fall into the argument of “Civil Society II”, and the so-called 
“African  Civil  Society”  seems  to  be  the  broadest definition, which encompasses “Civil 
Society  I”  and  “Civil  Society  II” altogether. Even though many researchers postulate that 
civil society should be a promoter of democracy, the concept of “African  Civil  Society” 
poses that civil society is not necessarily to be connected to democracy in Africa. In Africa, 
where the state, the economy and society are all different compared to early Europe, the 
purposes and means can be different as well. Also, this view enables us to look at the inner 
mechanism of civil society, not only focuses on its roles or functions in a society. South 
Africa is a country of Africa needless to say, but it has highly westernised aspects in terms of 
its historical and socio-economic context, and has a strong base on democracy now. What 
kind of perspective should we use for the analysis of civil society in South Africa? The next 















Civil society in South Africa is no less diverse than its population is, and especially the 
history of segregation, i.e. apartheid, makes it more complicated. According to Habib (2005), 
South African civil society used to have two faces under apartheid: “white civil society” and 
“black civil society” (Habib, 2005:672)1. Whilst “white civil society” established “collegiate 
relations” with the state, the majority of “black civil society” adopted “an adversarial mode of 
engagement”  (ibid.). This dichotomous existence of two civil societies reflected racial 
segregation and exclusion under apartheid, and their power balance had changed as liberation 
and  democratisation  were  happening.  Until  the  1980s,  “pro-apartheid”  or  “pro-business” 
white civil society dominated South African society (Habib, 2005:674). As the 1970s 
approached, “anti-apartheid” black civil society began to make their presence felt, and during 
the 1980s “black civil society” transcended “white civil society” within a few years, whereas 
“white  civil  society”  began  to  distance  themselves  from  the  apartheid  regime  (Habib, 
2005:672-675). After 1994, “the racial divide” of civil society “has all but disappeared”, and 
non-profit organisations (NPOs) “have profoundly influenced the emergence, shape and 
nature” of civil society in South Africa and South African society as a whole (Habib, 
2005:672; Swilling & Russell, 2002:3). The government committed itself to the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which provided NPOs with a central 
role in development (Swilling & Russell, 2002:4). In 1996, the RDP was replaced with “a 
neo-liberal macro-economic programme” known as the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which defined central roles “for the for-profit private sector 
in economic growth and service delivery” and “for the non-profit sector in poverty alleviation” 
(ibid.). Now civil society in South Africa has “adversarial and collegiate relations” with the 
state, that is to say, the twin roles for “watchdog” and “service delivery” for the poor2 (Habib, 
2005:672; Swilling & Russell, 2002:5). 
                                                 
1 Since he notes that “black civil society” was based on “Black Consciousness Movement (BMC)”, it 
includes groups organised by other racial categories than black Africans (Habib, 2005:674). Also, 
there must have been some organisations by white people which are against apartheid, but they are not 
included in “white civil society” by its definition. I will use the terms ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’ and 
‘Asians/Indians’ throughout the thesis but this does not imply that I agree with such racial 
classifications. These are however the official terms in use by the government. 
2 Atkinson (1996) notes that the ANC government has not yet settled down to a uniform, systematic 













The South African context of civil society indicates that both “Civil  Society  I”  and  “Civil 
Society  II” have consistently coexisted in South African civil society. Whether  it  is  “white 
civil society” or “black civil society” under apartheid, or whether it is a role of “watchdog” or 
“service  delivery” under democracy, civil society in South Africa has existed in strong 
association with the state. Although “white civil society” may not have promoted democracy, 
when you  look only  at  “white  society” under  apartheid,  it was  “the ability of  associational 
life”, which has “the positive effects of association for governance” over white people, and 
can  be  regarded  as  “Civil  Society  I”  (Foley &  Edwards,  1996:39).  Also,  even though the 
contemporary South African government is democratic one, the role of “watchdog” can be 
categorised  into  “Civil  Society  II”,  as  it  serves  “as  a  counterweight  to  the  state”  (ibid.). 
“Black civil society” is typically in “Civil Society II”, and the role of the delivery of services 
falls into “Civil Society I” without a doubt. We can say that South African society has always 
held both aspects of “Civil Society I” and “Civil Society II” throughout apartheid and post-
apartheid. On the other hand, in the Ekeh’s four types of civil society, “white civil society” 
can be categorised into  “primordial  public  associations”. They took the forms of official 
organisations under the apartheid regime, but only served the interests of white people. 
“Black civil society” is in-between “deviant civic associations” and “indigenous development 
associations” because whilst anti-apartheid organisations were banned until liberation, “black 
civil  society”  informally fought to overthrow the apartheid government outside  the  state’s 
control. Whether they are categorised in “deviant  civic  associations”  or  in “indigenous 
development associations” depends on whether one considers they fought for “democracy” or 
for “black people”, and this is why they are “in-between” them. In post-apartheid democratic 
South Africa, most organs of civil society are theoretically working in  the  realm of  “civic 
public”, since they serve the interests of the poor or the marginalised regardless of race3. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
widely different ways to civil society with different outcomes (Atkinson, 1996:310).  But still, current 
roles of civil society in South Africa can converge on “watchdog” and “service delivery” (see De Wet, 
2010; Habib, 2005; Swelling & Russell, 2002). 
3 Of  course  there  are  always  some  exceptions.  For  example,  some  people  include  “gangs”  in  civil 
society, and they are not necessarily working in the realm of “civic public”. However, in this study I 












To examine civil society in post-apartheid South Africa, we have to see both means and ends 
of them. As discussed above, major roles of civil society in post-apartheid South Africa are 
“watchdog” and “service delivery” (De Wet, 2010; Habib, 2005; Swelling & Russell, 2002). 
How does civil society in South Africa try to achieve these goals? Habib (2005) again 
describes the situations well: 
 
On the one end of the spectrum is a powerful set of formal service related NGOs that, 
as a result of the more enabling environment created by the democratic regime, have 
entered partnerships with or subcontracted to the state. These organizations have more 
engaged and collegiate relations with the state. On the other end of the spectrum is a 
group of community-based structures that actively challenge and oppose what they 
perceive as the implementation of neoliberalism. These organizations, whose activists 
covet the status of social movements, also have an explicit relationship with the state. 
This relationship, depending on the organization and the issue area, hovers 
somewhere between adversarialism and engagement, and sometimes involves both 
[…] But even when engaging the state, this is of a qualitatively different kind to that 
of the formal NGOs. The latter has a relationship with the state that is largely defined 
by its subcontractual role, whereas the former is on a relatively more even footing, 
engaging the state in an attempt to persuade it through lobbying, court action, and 
even outright resistance (Habib, 2005:685-656). 
 
This quotation explains that “formal NGOs” play a role of “service delivery” along with the 
state, whilst “a group of community-based structures” play a role of “watchdog”, often taking 
a form of “social movements”. This means that most of “service delivery” by civil society is 
done  in  the  form  of  “civic  public  associations” in  Ekeh’s categorisation, but it is not sure 
which associations “watchdog” falls into, until we scrutinise how it is conducted. 
 
Although social movements (or protest action) define South African civil society especially 
as a means  of  “watchdog”,  they have different characteristics from time to time. Ngwane 












protest politics has been playing a crucial role since apartheid era until now – “People took to 
the streets, either in marches, demonstrations or the erection of barricades, with the aim of 
winning political, economic or social demands” (Ngwane, 2010). According to him, there are 
three waves of protests in post-apartheid era. The first wave took place immediately after 
liberation, and it was involved in expressing dissatisfaction with “service delivery”, namely, 
municipal services, housing, roads, etc. The second wave took hold of the country from 
around  2000  organised  by  “new  social  movements”,  such  as  Anti-Privatisation Forum, 
Treatment Action Campaign, Jubilee South Africa, Landless Peoples Movement, Abahlali 
baseMjondolo and other organisations. The background to the second wave is “the increasing 
deterioration in living standards experienced by the working class as neoliberal policy started 
to bite” (ibid.). The last wave of mass action is the current one from around 2005 which 
consists of local community uprising and militant national strikes. They tend to have broad 
support and involve a big section of the community, they are often violent and disruptive, and 
their demands are related to the provision of basic services, the accountability of councillors 
and corruption. These local uprisings are often called “service delivery protests”, and this last 
wave of protests has been steadily increasing and spreading to new areas until now. It is 
asserted that these are “modes of political engagement that help ordinary people to challenge 
vested interest in order to win their demands and satisfy their needs” (ibid.). 
 
Ballard, Habib and Valodia (2006) also argue that “the most obvious tangible effect of social 
movements on the political landscape of this country is that they represent the interests of the 
poor and marginalised, and apply pressure on the government to pay greater attention to the 
welfare of these groups” (Ballard, Habib & Valodia, 2006:413). For them, a key function of 
social movements is that “they offer the poor a means of exercising power, and are thus ‘an 
avenue for marginalised people and those concerned about their interests to impact on 
material distribution, and social exclusion, and to claim a certain degree of influence and 
power  over  the  state  itself’”  (ibid.; Seekings & Matisonn, 2005:7). Therefore social 
movements and protest action “can actually strengthen democracy by ensuring that the voice 
of  the  weak,  the  downtrodden  and  the  excluded  is  heard”, rather than “undermine  the 














These arguments on social movements and protest action suggest that the role of “watchdog” 
by South African civil society should be also for the sake of the “civic public realm”, as is the 
case of  “service delivery”. However, although they play a role of “watchdog” for the poor 
and the marginalised regardless of their race, their means are not necessarily formal and are 
often out of state’s control. This indicates that the role of “watchdog” by South African civil 
society  fall  into  either  “civic public  associations” or  “deviant  civic  associations”  in Ekeh’s 
categorisation. At any rate, politically and theoretically, civil society in South Africa no 
longer serves “primordial public” as it used to do under the apartheid regime. This tendency 
is supposed to be conspicuous in urban area like Cape Town, where “democracy  is  said  to 
have been undermined by ‘neo-liberal’ municipal policies” (Seekings & Matisonn, 2005:2-3). 





The post-apartheid national policies such as the RDP and GEAR have large influence on 
urban policy-making and practice. Smith and Vawda (2003) argue how the local authorities 
and public participation have been reinforced in service delivery in Cape Town after 
transition to  democracy.  The  RDP  and GEAR  have  produced  the  idea  of  “Developmental 
Local Government (DLG)” for addressing economic growth and poverty eradication (Smith 
& Vawda, 2003:28). The DLG is committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and to 
improve the quality of their lives, and cultivates citizens through participation in service 
delivery, good governance, democratising development, and fostering economic growth. The 
mechanisms such as the RDP forums and Ward forums were built to promote public 
participation. The RDP forums are said to have served as a bridging, transitional arrangement 
between the first national democratic elections in 1994 and the local government elections in 
1996 in Cape Town. Longstanding civic umbrella organisations, like the South African 
National Civics Organisation (SANCO) formed a critical element of the community-based 
organisations that fed into the RDP forums. The RDP forums were “flawed” since it became 












and if there was clarity about their accountability to a political system (Smith & Vawda, 
2003:32).  
 
After 1996, the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) were developed to build the capacity of 
elected local councillors to represent the public interest to enhance its accountability. 
Democratically elected local councillors themselves are considered to be the most effective 
representatives of the public interest, and residents are supposed to communicate with their 
ward councillors in the Ward forums to reflect their needs and opinions. However, the Ward 
forums  serve  “in  an  advisory  and  guidance  capacity  only”, and as Staniland (2008) notes, 
these policies actually serve to undermine civil society empowerment whilst they seek to 
promote it (City of Cape Town, 2010; Staniland, 2008). He asserts  that  “the  fact  that  civil 
society is placed in a subordinate position in its relationship with political society and that 
political society dominates the distribution and administration of local government resources 
creates the possibility for patronage and ties many residents and civil society organisations to 
elected  politicians,  causing  them  to  refrain  from  voicing  discontent”  (Staniland,  2008:34). 
Also, the influence of neo-liberalism restricts the mechanisms of public participation and 
causes the decline of civil society. According to McDonald and Smith (2004), the regular 
employment of private-sector consultants by Cape Town policy-makers  provokes  “power 
imbalances”, and private consulting firms have “effectively replaced the role of civil society” 
in the restructuring of local government in Cape Town and have served to reinforce neo-
liberal policy leanings (McDonald & Smith, 2004:1480). This makes elected local councillors 
powerless in policy-making. Even if they effectively represented the public interests, they 
could not really reflect them in the policies. Indeed, public participation is “only effective in 
changing how government operates if the mechanisms within the bureaucracy are set up to 
implement such changes”, and local councillors do not hold power to change or make 
decisions beyond the national framework of neo-liberalism (Smith & Vawda, 2003:33). 
 
Against the hegemonic nature of this neo-liberalism, Capetonians have shown their opinions 
beyond the legitimate way of public participation. Amongst famous social movements based 
in Cape Town are the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Western Cape Anti-
Eviction Campaign (WCAEC). Both of them were established around 2000 and they are 












which is actually a national organisation founded in Cape Town, is “a  movement  that 
campaigns for affordable treatment for people living with HIV  and AIDS”, which  is  now 
world-famous and nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (Friedman & Mottiar, 2006:23). 
Using tactics of formal (the courts of law) and informal (the mass mobilisation) means, it 
effectively won access to anti-retroviral medication (ARVs) for people infected with HIV and 
AIDS. Besides this “watchdog”  role,  The TAC also  play  a  role  of  “service  delivery”  by 
helping the government roll out ARVs and offering HIV/AIDS education (Treatment Action 
Campaign, 2010). On the other hand, the WCAEC is  “a  movement  of  community 
organisations from poor, marginalised areas of Cape Town”, which consists of people sharing 
“threats and experiences of eviction and water disconnections, discontent with state policies 
of cost recovery on public services, and dissatisfaction with local political representation” 
(Oldfield & Stokke, 2006:111). Housing issue is one of the most visible expressions of the 
tension between public participation and neo-liberalism in post-apartheid South Africa, and 
the WCAEC is fighting through direct action, legal challenges, mass mobilisation and 
popular education, organisation capacity building, and democratising communities (Western 
Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, 2010). You can see that the WCAEC also uses the 
combination of formal and informal means to protest and plays both roles of “watchdog” and 
“service delivery” like the TAC. 
 
Whilst the TAC is a national organisation, and campaigns worldwide, the WCAEC is a much 
more  local body, bringing  together under  its  “umbrella” over 10 community organisations, 
crisis committees, and concerned residents movements (ibid.). In South African townships 
these “community-based groups” have often been operated under civic organisations, called 
“civics” (Staniland, 2008:38). Civics were popular, radically democratic community 
organisations that had played a key role in resistance to apartheid, and SANCO was formed 
as an umbrella body of civics (Desai & Pithouse, 2003). However after democratisation in 
1994, it is plausibly said that civics were “demobilised” and thus they “declined” (Desai & 
Pithouse, 2003; Seekings, 1996: Seekings, 1998, Seekings, 2000; Staniland, 2008). As 
discussed above, whilst the capacity of democratically elected local councillors and local 
governments were increased, SANCO has become marginalised and lost influence. Indeed, 
SANCO has been in a close relationship with the African National Congress (ANC), which 
transformed “from a liberation movement to a political party” (Seekings, 1998:1). After the 












Alliance or as a de facto party”, “failing to represent peoples’ interests to local government”, 
and even “defending the councillors and government to a discontented populace” (Seekings, 
2000:223; Staniland, 2008:41). We can say that since SANCO has virtually ceased from 
acting as a watchdog, alternatives such as the WCAEC were demanded and established to fill 
a vacancy for a player of “watchdog”. 
 
However, it is not correct to say that the importance and presence of SANCO have 
completely vanished in local communities in the South African cities. Zuern (2006) asserts 
that SANCO “maintains a significant though weak presence as a national body with local 
branches in South Africa today” (Zuern, 2006:181). The arguments of the decline of SANCO 
are  based  on  the  “static  understanding  of  political  opportunity  and  interpretation  of  civil 
society  as  necessarily  oppositional”,  and  they  “fatally  simplified  the  complex  interactions 
between state and civil society actors” (Zuern, 2006:197). Her point is that although its roles 
and objectives may be scattered and contradicted, SANCO still rigidly stands upon the 
elusive, porous and contextual boundaries of state-civil society interactions. Similarly, Cherry, 
Jones, and Seekings (2000) note the continued significance of SANCO through the research 
on associational activity in two townships (Guguletu in Cape Town and Kwazakele in Port 
Elizabeth). They affirm that although now SANCO “achieved a key goal, i.e. representative 
democracy  at  the  local  level”,  “there  remains  a  high  level  of  involvement  in  civic 
organization, especially at the level of street committees, and political parties” (Cherry, Jones 
& Seekings, 2000:903). Civic organisations (or branches of SANCO) have complex 
relationships with local structures – street committees – that exist in most parts of townships, 
and performing a range of tasks including dispute settlement and some policing, limited 
service provision and the representation of residents. The survey data proves that there 
continues to be a high level of popular engagement with broadly representative and 
accountable civic structures in South Africa’s African township (Cherry et al., 2000). 
 
In  fact,  this  “locality”  has  an  important  meaning  to  South  Africans.  Bekker,  Leilde, 
Cornelissen and Horstmeier (2000) and Cornelissen and Horstmeier (2002) examine the 
social and political construction of new identities in post-apartheid South Africa, focusing on 
the analysis of the Western Cape Province. They argue that the end of apartheid has brought 












to forge a new relationship with their society and country, where racial and ethnic identities 
used to be imposed institutionally under apartheid. Although provincial leaders claimed that a 
new “provincial  identity” was emerging  in  the post-apartheid Western Cape, the qualitative 
data reveals no meaningful provincial identity and weak national identity held amongst the 
residents (Bekker  et  al.,  2000:233).  The  “top-down”  efforts  to  construct  new,  “non-racial 
identity” in the Western Cape seem to be complex and interminable despite the use of media, 
symbols and election campaign, and former  “racial”  constructs  still  persist  (Cornelissen & 
Horstmeier, 2002:79). Shared meanings are drawn from language, from class and most 
strikingly from common locality, and local issues and local government are significantly 
important to residents. Race is an integral part of their identity as well, especially under 
specific circumstances: “in the presence of ignorance and extended racialised socialisation, in 
the presence of marginalisation and lack of alternative sources of pride and self-esteem, and 
in the presence of enduring economic deprivation” (Bekker et al., 2000:234). Considering the 
continued hardship of their living conditions, black people are considered to have a 
particularly strong sense of identity with their race. 
 
Discussion so far suggests that the national neo-liberal policies have a striking influence on 
the context of the social structures and civil society in the post-apartheid South African cities. 
Against the issues caused by market-oriented policy implementation and decentralisation, 
people do protest through formal and informal means. Presupposed players of these protests 
are  the  poor  and  the marginalised,  and  they  can  be  said  to  belong  either  to  “civic  public 
associations” or “deviant civic associations” in this sense,  in accordance with their ways of 
protests. These urban protests are part of “watchdog” role by civil society, and the instances 
of the TAC and the WCAEC tell us that the same organisation can play both roles of 
“watchdog” and “service delivery”. In the case of “service delivery”,  they are also working 
for the sake of the poor and the marginalised, thus civil society in Cape Town exists in the 
“civic public realm” in Ekeh’s argument. This is in line with the theoretical presumption of 
the roles of civil society at the national level. However, when we take into consideration the 
roles of SANCO and the strong presence of locality, the situation becomes complicated. The 
legacy of apartheid like racial identity still persists at the local community level, and power 
taking by the ANC makes things even more complex. Although SANCO used to represent 
the  interests  of  local  communities  during  apartheid,  now  it  entered  “political  society”,  and 












components of people’s identity. When we look at civil society at local community level, it is 
assumed that people are not necessarily involved in civil society purely because of their 
“grievances”  or  “poorness”,  i.e.  for  the  sake  of  civic  public. Then, what are the primary 





Within the context of post-apartheid South Africa, civil society is often argued in relation to 
state, especially how it can contribute to development and improvement  of  people’s  living 
conditions. After democratisation, civil  society  is mainly  assigned  the  roles  of  “watchdog” 
and “service delivery”, and this is conspicuous in the city like Cape Town, where neo-liberal 
policy implementation is dominant. Neo-liberal  policies  reinforce  the  role  of  “service 
delivery” by civil society, which eventually strengthen the role of “watchdog” by civil society 
through protests or social movements. Neo-liberalism causes fatal flaws in improving 
people’s  living situations, and the poor and the marginalised take formal and informal 
measures to express their grievances. Civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as 
a space for action to promote social justice, either through containing the power of elites 
(through organisations that play the role of “watchdog”) or through mobilisation by the poor 
themselves around their own concerns. 
 
However, civil society can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices of the 
wider society. When we look  at  the  argument  of  “African  Civil  Society” by Ekeh, civil 
society is not always associated with state or democracy. Those who work for the “primordial 
public” realm seek only for  the interests of  the people in  the same kinship including ethnic 
groups. Indeed, under the apartheid regime, South African civil society was divided into 
“white  civil  society”  and  “black  civil  society”, which  sought  only  for  the  interests  of  their 
own race and excluded those of the others. When we closely look at the post-apartheid 
situations at the local community level of Cape Town, we could still see a possibility that 
people are not necessarily participating in civil society because of their grievances. It is 












in associational activities just because they are interested in local issues or due to their racial 
identity. If we scrutinise each case of associational activities or protest action, it would not 
actually be for the sake of the poor or the marginalised as the literature of post-apartheid 
South African civil society often suggests. It could be for the purpose of politics, race, or 
local communities which they belong to. Indeed, what Ekeh  argues  as  “primordial  public” 
reflects the brutal Nigerian civil war, and puts an emphasis on ethnic sectionalism. The 
associations  categorised  into  “primordial  public  associations”  or  “indigenous development 
associations” in Nigeria are working only for the poor in the same ethnic group, and may 
even be hostile to the poor in the different ethnic groups (Ekeh, 1992:205-7). 
 
Ethnic sectionalism is a good example of the pathologies and injustices which civil society 
can reproduce out of the wider society. Pointer (2004) gives us another example. She 
considers the way that the representation of a social movement serves as a contested space of 
power, focusing on the case of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign (MPAEC) in 
Khayelitsha. Some aspects of the operation of MPAEC are examined, and it is revealed that 
the  techniques  of  control  by  a  centralised  and hierarchical  “old  left”  (of which MPAEC  is 
fairly characteristic) are not qualitatively much different from the mechanisms of control used 
by the state (Pointer, 2004:291). One major point she made is that there is no representation 
of women in MPAEC and in the WCAEC as well, in spite of the existing literature on “new 
social movements” often  celebrating  the  role of women. This reflects the common culture, 
especially Xhosa culture in this context, of the oppression of women by men. 
 
One more example of the pathologies which civil society can possess is shown by Egan and 
Wafer (2006). They take the case of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and 
recognise disjuncture between its base and leadership. The leadership of the SECC tends to 
understand their role as “providing localised resistance to the ideology of ‘cost recovery’ and 
neo-liberal policies in South Africa”, and “turned the electricity crisis into a political issue” 
(Egan & Wafer, 2006:60). However, at the branch level, the SECC members do not see 
themselves as part of general resistance to neo-liberalism or the vanguard of a populist new 
left alternative to the ANC. As a matter of fact, the majority of the SECC are middle-aged to 












Whereas the rank-and-file are mainly concerned about their actual material grievances, the 
leaders give the political meaning to their movements for the partisan reason. 
 
These are the examples of civil society, which is not necessarily working purely for the poor 
and the marginalised. There is a possibility that the real voices of the poor and the 
marginalised are ignored because of these pathologies and injustices. From the next chapter, I 
qualitatively and quantitatively examine whether we can find the other primary motivations 
to participate in civil society than grievances or poorness of people. As qualitative research, I 
analyse a case of the ‘toilet war’, which happened in Khayelitsha throughout 2010. What is 
relevant with this case is that this is in line with the current trend of protests which Ngwane 
argued – local community uprising associated with militant national strikes. Although I did 
not conduct research on strikes since it requires another set of research, a nation-wide strike 
did happen in South Africa just after the World Cup 2010, and the case of the ‘toilet war’ is 
one of the significant local community uprisings happening often in South Africa. Also it has 
happened in the largest township in Cape Town, Khayelitsha, which still have strong legacy 
of apartheid such as SANCO, poor and marginalised black population, and strong presence of 
local communities. I analyse articles on the case in media, and also conducted fieldwork in 
the questioned site in Khayelitsha, interviewing people there, asking why they are 
participating in protests and if not why they are not participating. Mainly semi-structured in-
depth interviews were conducted, and observations of some community meetings have been 
done as well. 17 interviews were conducted in total, and most of the interviewees in Makhaza 
were chosen by snowball sampling. The list of interviews is presented at the end of references. 
 
To avoid criticism that the ‘toilet war’ is just an exception, I also analyse quantitative data. I 
use the Cape Area Study (CAS) 2005, which was conducted by the Centre for Social Science 
Research at the University of Cape Town in 2005. CAS 2005 is relevant for this study 
because it covers the samples not only in Khayelitsha but also in the Cape Town Metropolis 
as a whole. The year 2005 is also within the same trend of protests as the case of the ‘toilet 
war’, and the African National Congress was the ruling party both in Cape Town and in the 
Western Cape Province, which is now replaced by the Democratic Alliance (DA). Comparing 
different years when the different political party dominates is useful for looking at political 












such as politics, race, psychological resources, grievances and poorness, and test which 
would be primary through regression analyses. Both in qualitative and quantitative analyses, I 
focus not only on protest action but also associational activities such as community meetings 
and community organisations. Through these analyses, we can see that people are not always 

















Disputes over toilets in the Makhaza area of Khayelitsha hit the headlines of several 
newspapers at the beginning of 2010. Makhaza, which means “cold” in Zulu (not in isiXhosa), 
is located at the east edge of Khayelitsha, and administratively it falls into Ward 95, Sub-
council 10 (Charlotte Maxeke), in the City of Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2010). 
Khayelitsha, which means “new home” in isiXhosa, is situated approximately 35 kilometres 
from the Cape Town city centre. It is part of the City of Cape Town’s South East Region, and 
commonly  known  as  Cape  Town’s  “poverty  trap”  (City  of  Cape  Town,  2006a:11).  It  is 
difficult to get the accurate demographics of Khayelitsha, but the City of Cape Town (2006a, 
2006b) and the Western Cape Province (2006) provide relatively credible demographic data 
of Khayelitsha as of 2005. According to the official report by the Western Cape Province 
(2006), Khayelitsha was home to approximately 407,000 people in 2005 (Western Cape 
Province, 2006:72). A large majority (65%) of the population were younger than 30 years old, 
and the population had more females (56%) than males (44%) (City of Cape Town, 
2006a:12). Approximately 70% of the adult population in Khayelitsha were economically 
active4, but only about 25% of the adult population were employed while 46% of the adult 
population were not employed even though they were economically active (City of Cape 
Town, 2006a:17). In other words, unemployment was widespread. More than half of the 
population came from the rural area of the Eastern Cape, looking for a job opportunity (City 
of Cape Town, 2006a:14-15). The average monthly household income in 2005 was R1,606 
for a mean household size of four persons per household, and the standard deviation of the 
mean household income was R1,296 (City of Cape Town, 2006a:20). From this figures you 
can infer that more than half of the population in Khayelitsha had incomes below what the 
                                                 
4 Economically active population refers to all persons available for work but excludes those under the 
age of 15 years old, students, scholars, housewives or homemakers, retired people, pensioners, 















It is far more difficult to get the relevant demographic data of Makhaza, so here I show a 
brief overview of Ward 95, which comprises Kuyasa and Nkanini, as well as Makhaza (City 
of Cape Town, 2010). According to the Western Cape Province (2006), the total population 
of Ward 95 was about 18,500 in 2005, and it was the only ward with a gender gap in favour 
of males, 60% males and 40% females (Western Cape Province, 2006:47). The report also 
shows that Ward 95 had a ratio of 68:32 for formal versus informal houses, and especially for 
Makhaza, Skuse and Cousins (2007) describe  it  as  “a  mix  of  formal  brick  houses  and 
informal  shacks”  (Western  Cape  Province,  2006:50;  Skuse  &  Cousins,  2007:982).  The 
majority of the population are also from the Eastern Cape like the residents of Khayelitsha as 
a whole (Western Cape Province, 2006:48). There is no available data of the current income 
situations in Ward 95 or in Makhaza, but the City of Cape Town (2006b) shows, from the 
South African national census 2001, that the residents in Ward 95 gain relatively average 
income, compared to the other wards in Khayelitsha (City of Cape Town, 2006b). Gavin 
Silber, the co-ordinator of an NGO called the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), illustrates that 
“Makhaza  is  not  one  of  the  worst  informal  areas  in  Khayelitsha.  [...]  Despite  being 
unquestionably impoverished, Makhaza has roads and is not as densely populated as other 
areas” (Silber, 2010, February 3). As far as I observed Makhaza during my fieldwork, I also 
have the same kind of sense. There is a big shopping centre and a big private high school at 
the central part of Makhaza, so it does not seem to be the worst place in Khayelitsha. I will 
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There is a strong political contest between the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) within the City of Cape Town as well as within the Western Cape 
Province, and the ‘toilet war’ should be understood within this political context. After 1994 
the ANC has governed at the national level and in almost all provinces and municipalities. 
The DA emerged as the largest opposition party. The DA won the municipal elections in 
2006 in Cape Town and the provincial elections in 2009 in the Western Cape. There has 
therefore been intense competition between the ANC and the DA in Cape Town.  
 
The first article of the ‘toilet war’ appeared on 20 January 2010, when the African National 
Congress Youth League (ANCYL) accused the city authorities of human rights violations for 
failing to provide walls for temporary toilets around Makhaza in Khayelitsha. The ANCYL 
officially asked the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to intervene and 












2010, January 20). Chumile Sali, the ANCYL deputy secretary of the Dullah Omar branch, 
said,  “The city had violated  the constitution by  providing  toilets without walls,  so denying 
people  their  right  to  privacy”  (ibid.). In his letter to the SAHRC chairperson, Lawrence 
Mushwana, Sali wrote that residents had to cover themselves with blankets when using their 
toilets, and said: 
 
The conditions to which residents are subjected are tantamount to crimes against 
humanity. Our plea to the SAHRC is to compel the City Council to build toilet walls 
to ensure the rights, dignity, privacy and freedom of residents of Ward 95 are 
protected, to charge the council with violations of human rights – and to take it to task 
for disregarding the constitution and the Bill of Rights (Hartley, 2010, January 21).  
 
Andile Lili, the chairperson of the Ward 95 Development Forum and also the ANCYL 
treasurer  of  the Dullar Omar branch,  blamed  the  city  too  and  said,  “You won’t  see  this  in 
coloured or white areas.  It’s as  if black don’t contribute  to  the city.  If  the council does not 
respond positively we will make this ungovernable. We’ll destroy council property. Yes, it is 
breaking  the  law, but what  you  see here undermines our democracy”  (ibid.). ANC and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) immediately added their criticism and 
blamed DA in  the  Western  Cape  for  “being  concerned  only  with  the  interests  of  their 
predominantly white and coloured electorate while neglecting the needs of the black 
community” (Kalipa, 2010, January 24). 
 
However, the Mayor of Cape Town, Dan Plato (from the DA), responded that the open toilets 
were an arrangement the residents had agreed to and said that each household was 
responsible for building their own enclosures (Hartley, 2010, January 21). According to him, 
the  city’s  new  housing  department initiated the installation of 1250 toilets in Town 2 and 
Makhaza (ibid.). The city initially installed the concrete enclosed toilets on a ratio, one toilet 
for five plots, as this is only a temporary measure until the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) houses are built. These toilets were “rejected by the community” and after 
negotiations, it was agreed that the city would provide one toilet per family and the 
community would build their own enclosures (ibid.). Also, the DA chairperson of Sub-
council 10 (Charlotte Maxeke), Stuart Pringle, said that the ANCYL is “politicking” when it 
accuses the City Council of not building walls around toilets in the Makhaza area of 












He asserted that the city and residents had agreed three years ago that the municipality would 
install open-air toilets, which residents themselves would enclose (ibid.). He continued,  “It 
[the ANCYL] does create the impression they are more interested in scoring political points 
than helping to promote service delivery. [...] We had a community meeting last Wednesday 
but nobody raised this matter. [...] This is purely political” (ibid.). 
 
The City Council manager for new housing, Herman Steyn, said that the city would go to the 
place and look if there is a way they could help them with “second-hand building materials” 
(Hartley, 2010, January 21). Then on 25 January, about two hours before an SAHRC 
investigator arrived, the city workers started to erect wood and iron enclosures on site (Van 
der Fort, 2010, January 26). With them was the mayoral committee (Mayco) member for 
housing, Shehaam Sims, who said that the mayor sent her (ibid.). However, leaders from the 
Ward 95 Development Forum stopped them from erecting enclosures because they “were not 
consulted  and  did  not want  the  city  to  erect  zinc  sheets  around  the  toilets”  (ibid.). On 28 
January, the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, contributed an article to Cape Times, 
saying that the  agreement  arose out of  “a valid  public-private partnership between the city 
and a community”, and that “[e]very issue will be given a ‘race’ twist” in the run-up to the 
election (Zille, 2010, January 28). 
 
The article on 27 January in The Times gives us the chronological facts since 2007. The DA-
led government in Cape Town began a process of upgrading the 222 unserviced shack 
settlements in 2007 around Cape Town, including Makhaza (Mnqasela, 2010, January 27). 
The budget allowed for one flush toilet for every five families, which was in line with the 
national  “norm”  for  the  upgrading  of  the  unserviced  shack  settlements  (ibid.). The city 
initially planned to build 300 fully working and covered toilets for the Makhaza community, 
but in the process of discussing the project, the community requested that each family should 
have its own toilet (ibid.). The ANC councillor of Ward 95, Nolufefe Gexa, supported this 
request, and it was agreed that the city would stretch the budget so that each family could 
have its own toilet while families would construct their own enclosures (ibid.). Then the city 
completed installing the 1316 toilets instead of building completely the initial 300 communal 
toilets by the end of 2009, and the residents successfully enclosed 1265 toilets while 51 
families could not afford it (ibid.). There is no official evidence that the agreement between 
the city and the community exists, which both the city and the community admitted, but 













Hartley, personal communication, 31 August 2010). And given that I found quite a few 
communal concrete-covered toilets during my fieldwork in Makhaza, this 2007 project was 
not the first attempt to build communal toilets in this area. The city had already built some 
communal toilets before 2007, and then the community rejected the 2007 project of building 
more communal toilets. This is consistent with what Plato said above. 
 
While the ANC supporters and the DA supporters kept criticising each other, the issue was 
gradually developing  into  the broader arguments on poor service delivery  and “the  right  to 
basic sanitation” for  the South African people as a whole (Silber, 2010, February 3). Gavin 
Silber, the co-ordinator of an NGO called the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), stated like this:  
 
What has been overlooked, however, is that these rights are denied to millions in 
South Africa on a daily basis. [...] The protracted absence of the basic services that 
many of us take for granted and the failure to acknowledge this deficit has resulted in 
the normalisation of suffering, and the routine violation of basic human rights. [...] we 
have a duty to hold the incumbent city and provincial government accountable in 
ensuring that norms and standards are maintained. The Water Service Act (108 of 
2007)  notes  how  everyone  has  the  right  to  “basic  sanitation”  [...]  it  states  that  the 
municipality or local council is responsible for ensuring access to water services: that 
local government has failed to take responsibility for this incident must be strongly 
condemned. We must, however, also acknowledge that this is not an isolated case and 
certainly not  limited  to  the  DA’s  term  of  government.  It  should  not  be  used  as 
ammunition of mudslinging, but rather as an opportunity to initiate dialogue and 
action on an issue that has been neglected for too long (ibid.). 
 
The SJC was organised in 2008 “by a diverse group of individuals from the Cape Town 
community who had come together in the Civil Society response to the xenophobia crisis” 
(Social Justice Coalition, 2011). It is based in Khayelitsha and forms a movement to protest 
against the failure of the government regarding service delivery, accountability and the 
failure of governments at all levels to implement the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution. 
The SJC has, like other pro-poor non-government organisations, used the Constitution and 
courts to hold the government to account. Regarding the toilet issue, it organised several 












and safe toilets to the residents of informal settlements in Khayelitsha (Social Justice 
Coalition, 2010a). At the time, they tried to draw attention to sanitation standards in 
townships  and  encouraged  people  “to  see  an  issue  which  is  seldom  discussed  (given  its 
private  nature),  but  fundamentally  important  to  one’s  daily  routine,  making mainstream 
headline news”  (ibid.). Their  intension was  to prompt debate around “the complex  issue of 
delivery  of  sanitation  services”,  and  “the  broader  issue  of  improving  service  delivery” 
through better consultation with communities (ibid.). After the SJC took part in the issue, 
Helen  Zille  “changed  tack”  and  “apologised  for  the  unenclosed  toilets  debacle”  (Warner, 
2010, May 17). However, despite her apology, the issue did not calm down and big collision 





On 24 May, Dan Plato personally supervised the erection of 51 enclosures, but shortly before 
the last enclosure was erected, the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum members 
began demolishing them (Hartley, 2010, May 25). They told residents to join them and while 
some of them participated, others watched in shock or tried to stop the destruction (ibid.). 
Some of the residents tried to save their enclosures, but were told by the members of the 
ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum that  “the  community  had  rejected  the 
corrugated  enclosures  and  wanted  concrete  ones”  (ibid.). Plato said that he made an 
agreement with the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum that open toilets would be 
enclosed by the city (ibid.). He also went from house to house and interviewed each 
household to get residents’ permission for enclosures, and then residents signed an agreement 
(ibid.). According to Chumile Sali, Plato “created the impression” that the enclosures would 
be concrete ones, and he asked the residents only two questions during the interviews: 1) Do 
you want the city to enclose your toilet? 2) Do you want the city to offer you the materials? 
(C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). There was no mention of the enclosing 
materials, and Andile Lili insisted that nobody told the residents what materials would be 
used (Hartley, 2010, May 25). The residents once signed the agreement, but at the community 
meeting after the agreement, the community decided to reject the enclosures if they were not 













truthful”  (ibid.). In return,  the  ANCYL  vowed  to  make  Cape  Town  “ungovernable”  and 
warned that council property would be vandalised or destroyed because the city had failed to 
provide proper services in informal settlements (Hartley & Mtyala, 2010, May 26). “This is 
not a joke. We are serious”, said the executive member of the ANCYL Dullah Omar branch, 
Loyiso Nkohla (ibid.). 
 
Then, a violent confrontation sparked. Shortly before dawn on 31 May, the City Council sent 
contract staff to Makhaza, escorted by about 50 heavily armed Metro Police officers, and they 
smashed the remaining open toilets and loaded them on to trucks (Hartley & Ndenze, 2010, 
June 1). This surprising action by the city reportedly incensed the Makhaza residents, who 
“responded  by  barricading  the  streets  with  burning  tyres”  and  confront  the  police  officers 
(ibid.). The police fired rubber bullets and a woman was injured after the police officers and 
residents traded blows during one of the stand-offs (ibid.). Hartley and Ndenze (2010) 
reported that this confrontation saw “racism accusations” levelled against the DA-led council, 
since  the  residents  chanted  “kill  the  boer,  kill  the  farmer”  as  they  toyi-toyied5 and hurled 
insults at the police (ibid.). Tempers temporarily calmed when the ANC provincial task team 
leader Membathisi Mdladlana and the Human Settlements Deputy Minister Zoe Kota arrived 




On the next day, this single protest over toilet enclosures in Makhaza evolved into the big 
protests throughout Khayelitsha against poor services (Hartley & Mtyala, 2010, June 2). The 
residents again started burning tyres in Baden Powell Drive in the evening on 31 May, and 
then it spread to Mew Way, close to N2 freeway, Walter Sisulu Drive in Makhaza and an 
area near the R300 highway (ibid.). In the morning on 1 June, passing vehicles on the N2 
freeway were pelted with stones as residents of Taiwan informal settlement in Site C 
protested along Mew Way and burned rubbish in the street (ibid.). While the N2 freeway was 
                                                 
5 “Toyi-toyi”  means  “strike”  or  “protest”  in  the  local  language  in  South  Africa  (Mr.  R,  personal 












closed intermittently as the police tried to restore order, about 60 residents of Makhaza 
marched to Baden Powell Drive joined by Nkanini residents (ibid.). They burned tyres, 
forcing motorists to turn away, and burning barricades were erected in Walter Sisulu Drive 
(ibid.). By the noon on 1 June, several fires extinguished earlier had been restarted, a pall of 
black smoke hung over Khayelitsha (ibid.). The police fired rubber bullets as well as stun 
grenades and 32 people were in the police custody, which caused another marching by the 
protesters to the Harare police station, calling for the release of the detained people (ibid.). In 
a scene reminiscent of anti-apartheid protests, the residents were singing “Senzeni na Senzeni 
na?” (What have we done, what have we done?) during their protests (ibid.). 
 
From these articles, we can say that the series of violent protest action is led by the ANCYL. 
But not only the ANCYL, but also the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) 
in other area than Makhaza warned that demonstrations would continue in other townships 
over a lack of electricity and poor sanitation (Hartley & Pietersen, 2010, June 3). SANCO 
chairperson in Kuyasa, Nuluvo  Lime  said,  “We  are  not  going  to  stop  until  we  get  decent 
services.  Our  children  are  getting  sick”  (ibid.). Also, the residents of Ndlovini 6  area in 
Khayelitsha took the streets in the morning on 2 June, demonstrating against insufficient 
toilets, housing issues and minimal economic development (Jassiem, Makinana & Prince, 
2010, June 2). One of the residents said that the people of Ndlovini had not been protesting in 
solidarity with their Makhaza counterparts, and that Ndlovini protest was not political but a 
cry for the city to install adequate services in their area (ibid.).  The  resident  said,  “This 
protest was not organised by any organisation. It was the community who came together and 
decided to protest to bring attention to their plight” (ibid.). Even outside Khayelitsha, at the 
north of Cape Town, 140 kilometres up the N1 highway to De Doorns, a refugee rights group 
accused Helen Zille of leaving 300 displaced Zimbabweans in a camp without a single toilet 
(Majavu, 2010, June 3). The protests spread even to a refugee camp around Cape Town. 
While the SJC strongly condemned the ANCYL for being too violent, it continued to accuse 
the city of not ensuring human rights of residents in Khayelitsha (Social Justice Coalition, 
2010b). 
 
                                                 
6 Ndlovini, also called Monwabisi Park, is an informal settlement situated near Khayelitsha cemetery 














On 11 June, the SAHRC finally published the report on this case, in response to the plea 
made  by  the ANCYL  in  January.  The  report  concludes  that  the  city  violated  “the  right  to 
dignity”  as  envisaged by  section 10 of  the Constitution by not  enclosing  the  toilets  (South 
African Human Rights Commission, 2010:9). It says that  the city’s project  to provide flush 
toilets for all residents was “reasonable” and “commendable” considering it tried to avoid the 
impact of budget limitations and to achieve the facilitation of access to sewage systems to all 




have featured in the planning and implementation of this project (South African Human 
Rights Commission, 2010:8). The report also refers to the alleged actions by the community 
of removing  the  corrugated  metal  sheets  the  city  provided  on  30  May  as  it  “cannot  be 
condoned”  but  it  has  to  be  said  that  “given  the  high  rate  of  crime  in  the  area  in  question, 
corrugated iron sheeting cannot be regarded as adequate or safe enclosures (ibid.). It is 
recommended that the city should re-install the 51 toilets and adequately enclose them 
immediately with more durable structures, as well as ensure proper lighting (South African 
Human Rights Commission, 2010:9). 
 
After the report published by the SAHRC, Helen Zille, Dan Plato, the ANCYL, and the Co-
operative Governance and Traditional Affairs Minister Sicelo Shiceka held a meeting on 24 
June (Hartley, 2010, June 25). When one of the ANCYL members, Loyiso Nkohla, insulted 
Zille and Plato, they “stormed out” of the meeting and negotiation broke off (ibid.). 
 
While the solution to the conflict could not be found, on 27 June SANCO invited a Paarl 
company called the Darrow Pre-Cast to help solve the problem (Hartley, 2010, June 28). 
SANCO arranged for the company to train people in Makhaza how to manufacture pre-cast 
toilet structures, and the owner of the company, Jeff Franciscus, said that he would donate the 












the area (ibid.). The president of the national SANCO Ruth Bhengu said, “Service delivery 
does not mean only to provide a toilet. It has to have a community development component, 
particularly in poor areas where people are unskilled and unemployable. As Sanco [sic], we 
are also interested in the empowerment of people and we inculcate the culture of 
responsibility” (ibid.). The toilet issue seemed to head for a peaceful end with this plan, but 
the process has been postponed since Franciscus faced two unrelated summonses in 
connection with thousands of Rands owed to business people and also had two complaints of 
fraud and theft lodged against him (Hartley, 2010, August 3). Also, the city did not allow him 
to build a factory there because the land had to be reasoned and took a long time to do it (A. 
Hartley, personal communication, 31 August 2010). 
 
 On 24 August, a lawyer was employed to take legal action against the City Council, and the 
issue was brought up for trial and the case is still under trial at the time of writing this thesis 
(January 2011), as well as violent protest action keep going on in Khayelitsha from time to 
time (Hartley, 2010, August 25). 
 
The interesting point of this case is that the issue has two distinctive aspects: politicking by 
the ANCYL and protest against poor services by communities. Indeed, various intensions by 
the DA, the ANCYL, communities, NGOs, and a private company, are complicatedly 
interlacing. One thing you have to bear in mind is that Andile Lili wears ‘two hats’: he is 
chairperson of the Ward 95 Development Forum and at the same time a member of the 
ANCYL. This means that the opinions of the Ward 95 Development Forum might reflect 
those of the ANCYL. Indeed, because the narrative above is gained mostly from newspapers, 
the  terms such as “communities” or “residents” are  too vague  to  figure out who  represents 
what. The next chapter analyses in detail who are involved in and who are not, and examines 

















My research field is called Zone 14, one of the small sections in Makhaza. There are about 
300 households in Zone 14, all of which are shack settlements. The residents came from 
either Silvertown (SST) or Town 2, nearby Zone 14. In 2006, the City Council built basic 
infrastructures such as roads, electricity and communal toilets (one for every five households) 
in Zone 14, so as to encourage some residents from Silvertown and Town 2 to immigrate due 
to overcrowding there. Then people moved in and built their own shacks. Most of the 
residents who could not afford to enclose their own toilets are concentrated in Zone 14, and 
this is the place where the rampage started. I walked around this area by myself once or twice 
a week from September 2010 to January 2011, talking to and asking the residents about the 





The  ‘toilet  war’  reflects  an aspect of civil society in South Africa, which is generally 
celebrated as a space for action to promote social justice. The typical example is the SJC. As 
seen in the former chapter, they have organised several demonstrations and released some 
articles in public regarding this issue. What is outstanding regarding their role is that they 
developed  the  issue  into  the  broader  arguments  on  poor  service  delivery  and  the  “right to 
basic sanitation” for South Africans as a whole (Silber, 2010, February 3). They proclaimed 
that this kind of humiliating situation is not unique to Makhaza or the DA-led government, 
and that millions of South Africans are suffering from the same kind of problems. Their 














The SAHRC is another example of an organisation working for civil rights. In response to the 
plea made by the ANCYL, they concluded that the city violated  “the  right  to  dignity”  as 
envisaged by section 10 of the Constitution by not enclosing the toilets (South African 
Human Rights Commission, 2010:9). They also admit that the city’s project to provide flush 
toilets for all residents beyond the “national norm”, one toilet for every five households, was 
reasonable and commendable. Nevertheless, they accused the city because no consideration 
was made for those who were unemployed and poor, those who suffer with a disability, and 
those most vulnerable to violence. Their concern is also the protection of human rights, and 
they require the city to re-install the 51 toilets and adequately enclose them immediately with 
more durable structures, as well as ensure proper lighting.  
 
Although ultimately it did not play a successful role in the case, the Darrow Pre-Cast, a 
company arranged for training the unemployed in Makhaza and offering pre-cast toilet 
structures, seems to be another example. The owner of the company, Jeff Franciscus, said, 
“We stated categorically that we want to employ only those people who are unemployed. We 
also made it clear we do not want any political  involvement” (Hartley, 2010, June 28). His 
business model included setting up a pre-cast factory in Makhaza, where the demand was 
high as it reduced transportation costs. It was going to give employees a 49 percent stake in 
the factory on condition that they were equipped to sustain the factory and run the business 
successfully on their own (ibid.). If their plan was accepted and implemented, the toilet issue 
could have been resolved in a peaceful way. As a private company their primary objective 
should have been to make a profit, but their plan in fact was to create jobs for the poor and 
the unemployed around Makhaza. 
 
Despite these attempts to ensure the civil rights of the residents in Zone 14, other aspects of 
civil society interfered with securing the human rights and dignity of “the poorest of the poor” 
there. The “community”, the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum refused and 
destroyed the corrugated enclosures which the city built, and the City Council finally 












Why is the ANCYL involved in this issue? Why are they not representing the interests of 





Firstly, we examine the general decision-making process in Zone 14, where there are three 
types of community meetings: regular SANCO leaders meetings, regular Street Committee 
meetings and irregular general meetings (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 
October 2010). SANCO has a strong presence in Zone 14, and when the residents mention 
“community leaders”, it usually means 15 members of SANCO in Zone 14. Leaders meetings 
are held once a week and only 15 SANCO members are allowed to attend. The meetings deal 
with issues specifically in Zone 14, and they are closed to the public. When I observed one of 
the leaders meetings for a short time, they did not tell me what they were going to discuss 
since they discuss their “personal issues” in Zone 14 (Anonymous, personal communication, 
14 November 2010). I asked a couple of questions regarding the toilet issues, but was forced 
to leave the meeting after that. 
 
The Street Committees play a subordinate role to SANCO in Zone 14. To be precise, the 
residents firstly formed the Street Committees and they were integrated into SANCO (V. 
Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010). The SANCO members are also the 
leaders of each Street Committee, all of which hold weekly meetings as well. The Street 
Committees are based on each street in Zone 14, and when there is an issue between residents 
the Street Committees will deal with it first. If the Street Committees cannot resolve the issue, 
then they take the matter to SANCO. There are several sections in the Street Committees 
such as housing, education, health, security, and they deal with those kinds of issues 
respectively. The residents also consult with the Street Committees in order to get permission 













General meetings are held when necessary. I did not have a chance to attend any of the 
general meetings, but their topics include security, a “naughty boy” in Zone 14, etc. (Lulu, 
personal communication, 13 November 2010). The residents are informed about the meetings 
by a car making announcements with a loud speaker beforehand. They can vote only when 
they elect the leaders and chairpersons for the Street Committees or SANCO in Zone 14, 
which happens every two years, but otherwise they just discuss issues by talking (Lulu, 
personal communication, 15 January 2011; V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 29 
September 2010). It is not compulsory for the residents to attend the general meetings. In fact, 
they often miss the meetings because they “go to church” or they are “busy with their work” 
(Lulu, personal communication, 13 November 2010; Mandi, personal communication, 20 
October 2010; Shepard, personal communication, 29 September 2010). Moreover, 
considering one resident’s statement that she does not have to go to the meetings because her 
husband usually goes there and can tell her what is going on, the general meetings are rather 
the place for announcement to the residents than the place for decision-making by the 
residents (Lulu, person communication, 7 November 2010). 
 
As you can see, Zone 14 usually has a very hierarchical, but systematic, democratic structure 
of associational activities. Indeed, they even organise a self-patrol organisation by themselves 
and 83 members patrol Zone 14 every hour from 21:00 to 02:00 every night (David, personal 
communication, 7 November 2010; V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 
2010). One possible reason for their strong association is that most of the residents moved 
into Zone 14 from the same area (Silvertown and Town 2, which are close to each other) at 
the same time in 2006. One resident told me that they knew each other before they moved in 
(Lulu, personal communication, 15 January 2011). Thus it is unlikely that the ANCYL has 
carried out a series of action against the will of residents in Zone 14. In fact, when I attended 
one of the SANCO leaders meetings, they all agreed that “in the media it looked like the 
ANCYL was agitating the community but it was the decision of the entire community” 
(Anonymous, personal communication, 14 November 2010). The leaders are democratically 
elected by the residents in Zone 14, and the residents have opportunities to discuss the issues 
with the leaders directly. Also, 15 SANCO members reflect the general profiles of the 
residents in Zone 14: males and females are equally balanced, not well-educated, not fluent in 













However, ironically, this systematic, participatory and democratic structure of decision-
making process in Zone 14 marginalises “the poorest of the poor”, who are supposed to be 
protected by civil society. Civil society in Zone 14 reflects one of the injustices of democracy 
itself: “ignorance of the minority”. The poorest of the poor in Zone 14, who could not afford 
their toilet enclosures, are marginalised not only from the policy-making level in the City 
Council, but also from the decision-making level in the community. They wanted the 
enclosure even if it was zinc, but their voice was oppressed and ignored by the community. 
An article shows how the destruction of the enclosures provided by the city was against the 
will of the residents who did not have their enclosures. 
 
A tearful resident, who refused to give her name as she feared intimidation, said: “It 
was humiliating to use the toilet when people see you. There is covering now, but 
look  at  this  (destruction).  It  is  not what  I want.” Resident  Phillip Bayapeli  and  his 
wife tried in vain to save their enclosure, but were told the community had rejected 
the corrugated enclosures and wanted concrete ones (Hartley, 2010, May 25). 
 
One of the SANCO members in Zone 14 also told me that the residents wanted the enclosures 
even if they were made from zinc. He enclosed his own toilet by himself and helped to break 
down the zinc wall with the ANCYL, but said: 
 
I want it [the enclosure offered by the city] for my people. Young ladies have to cover 
themselves with blanket [when they use the open toilets]. Someone has no roof so 
they have to cover themselves with blanket when it is raining (V. Magxabhela, 
personal communication, 29 September 2010). 
 
His wish was not realised because he was the only one who wanted the corrugated enclosures 
which the city offered. When I walked around Zone 14, I found no households which 












households in Zone 14 are actually shack settlements. Indeed, almost every household in 
Zone 14 enclosed their toilets with corrugated walls. Nonetheless, nobody could do anything 





The decisions over the toilet issue themselves were more or less legitimate in terms of the 
decision-making process in Zone 14. Therefore, the question is: even though some residents 
kept suffering, why did the SANCO members make such decisions? There was 
overwhelming intervention by the ANCYL. To be precise, the toilet issue was virtually 
entrusted by SANCO in Zone 14 to the ANCYL, especially to Andile Lili and Chumile Sali. 
When I talked with the chairperson of SANCO in Zone 14, he said, “They [Lili and Sali] 
know everything about toilet problems. They will report me everything. They are good guys. 
They are in charge of that thing” (Tolo, personal communication, 20 November 2010). 
Although the community leaders in Zone 14 may be the SANCO members, the “commander” 
of the ‘toilet war’ is the ANCYL. And the ANCYL and the residents in Zone 14 respectively 
have their own purposes to get involved in the ‘toilet war’. Firstly we look at the “partisan” 
purposes of the ANCYL. 
 
The presence of the ANCYL in Zone 14 is partial and specialised in the toilet issue. One of 
the SANCO members in Zone 14 said, “They do not always come to the community meeting. 
They come only when they have something to say” (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 
29 September 2010). Indeed, neither Lili nor Sali is a member of the SANCO or a leader of 
the Street Committee, and Sali had not even lived in Khayelitsha until the beginning of 2010 
(C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). He moved into Lili’s shack in Zone 14 
after the ‘toilet war’ started. They met each other through the ANCYL. The majority of the 
residents in Zone 14 are not well-educated, but Sali is currently studying law at the 
University of the Western Cape. He is the one who wrote the plea to the SAHRC, which is 
invoking the discourse of constitutional jurisprudence. This skewed presence of the ANCYL 













The ANCYL allegedly appealed to the SAHRC to intervene and punish the City Council for 
the sake of the Makhaza residents’ “rights to dignity and respect” (Solomons, 2010, January 
20). However, their incentive is not purely for the Makhaza residents’ dignity and respect. 
They frame another plot: to paint a picture of bad governance by the DA. It was strange from 
the beginning that the ANCYL, not the Ward 95 Development Forum or SANCO in Zone 14, 
directly lodged the complaint to the SAHRC. The Ward 95 Development Forum is supposed 
to represent the interests of residents in Ward 95 and communicate with the ward councillor, 
but the chairperson of the forum, Andile Lili, is also a member of the ANCYL. As Hartley 
told me during my interview, the forum is “for  ANCYL”  (A.  Hartley,  personal 
communication, 31 August 2010). In fact, before the ANCYL sent the plea to the SAHRC, 
the forum did not bring the issue to the sub-council meeting via the ward councillor there. As 
Stuart Pringle, the chairperson of Sub-Council 10 said, “We had a community meeting [sub-
council meeting] last Wednesday and nobody raised this matter” (Hartley, 2010, January 25). 
The forum as well as the ANCYL did not use the participatory processes of decision-making 
to express the residents’ grievances up to the government. The toilet problems would not 
necessarily have been resolved even if they had undertaken a legitimate procedure. But by 
going straight to the SAHRC, the ANCYL attracted public attention and created a picture of 
bad governance by the DA. 
 
I also heard an interesting story about the Darrow Pre-Cast. Whilst both Hartley and Sali told 
me that the city did not allow the company to carry out its plan, one of the SANCO members 
told me that the ANCYL was also against the plan (A. Hartley, personal communication, 31 
August 2010; V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010; C. Sali, personal 
communication, 23 October 2010). He said:  
 
Youth League is actually refusing the Paarl company to do so because they assume 
the company would charge a lot of money after installing concrete structure to the 
community, and the community then would not afford it. They also want the City to 
install the concrete structure, because it is what the city should do. I think they just 












they only defended their [ANCYL] side (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 
October 2010). 
 
What he was trying to explain is that the ANCYL does not say anything disadvantageous 
about themselves in public, such as the fact that they were refusing the Darrow Pre-Cast. 
Whilst they kept saying that  “this  is  not  about  politics  but  human  rights  and  dignity”, the 
ANCYL actually left the Makhaza residents’ human rights and dignity violated by refusing 
and destroying the enclosures which the city provided (A. Lili, personal communication, 13 
November 2010; C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). What the ANCYL was 
doing was just an attempt to make the city build concrete enclosures, without seeking any 
alternatives. This is because the ANCYL wanted to keep criticising the DA for bad 
governance. 
 
The statements of the members of the ANCYL also reveal their true aim. They only accuse 
the DA of bad governance, and never criticise the system of service delivery or neo-
liberalism in South Africa. When I interviewed Lili, he said, “The DA-led city and the 
Western Cape are such an arrogant government ever. If they keep doing like that, all the local 
municipalities will turn out to be chaos next January. We ANCYL have a capacity” (A. Lili, 
personal communication, 13 November 2010). Loyiso Nkohla also said that “it was typical of 
the DA-run city to look after the interests of their predominantly white and coloured 
electorate while neglecting the needs of the black community” (Kalipa, 2010, January 25). 
“Divide and  rule  is what  the DA are doing”, said Nkohla. (ibid.). They do not criticise the 
ideology or systems behind the issues but accuse only one political party. This is not usual 
amongst the general protests or social movements in South Africa, which were overviewed in 
Chapter 1. The ANCYL surely have partisan purposes in their mind. 
 
The ANCYL seems to be less interested in participatory processes of decision-making or 
even the welfare of the poor, and more interested in scoring political points against the DA. 
However, the residents in Zone 14, especially the SANCO members, are not necessarily 
protesting just to accuse the DA. In this sense, there is disjuncture between the leadership of 












leadership and its base in the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee. Since the commander of 
the ‘toilet war’, the ANCYL, always tries to politick and make the DA-led city compensate, it 





The residents in Zone 14 were furious about the very fact that they were given toilets without 
enclosures. It is true that they were angry at what the DA had done, but their claim is not 
necessarily condemning the DA. Rather, they were fighting for black people, who have been 
suffering oppression through decades of apartheid and continue to do so even now. The 
statement from the chairperson of SANCO in Zone 14 illustrates this well. With tears of 
wrath, he said to me: 
 
I don’t want to talk about that. It is too much for me. You know Nelson Mandela? 
When Nelson Mandela was released and became the president, we were promised that 
kind of things would never never never never never happen again. But look at this 
toilet. I can show you, this is not for human. I’m telling you. You know coloured? 
White people, coloured people, never use this kind of toilet. I am for the ANC. I 
cannot change it. If I want to leave the ANC, I cannot do that (Tolo, personal 
communication, 13 November 2010). 
 
Also when I attended the SANCO leaders meeting, I heard the same kind of things. They told 
me that all the SANCO members were there when Zone 14 residents were destroying the 
corrugated enclosures which the city built. One of the members said, “The community did not 
agree to those open toilets. White people never use these kinds of toilets” (Anonymous, 
personal communication, 14 November 2010). Their object of anger is rather white people or 
racism itself than the DA, a mere political party. For the residents in Zone 14, the fact that the 
non-ANC government built the open toilets for black people invokes what happened to them 












people, who are still fighting against the ghost of apartheid. When they refer to the ANC, it is 
not just a political party, but a “liberation movement” with which they fought against 
apartheid (Seekings, 1998:1). Indeed, it is SANCO which arranged the Darrow Pre-Cast to 
manufacture concrete structures for the Makhaza residents. When the owner of the company 
got into trouble, they tried to organise another company to undertake the task, one of the 
SANCO members in Zone 14 told me (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 29 
September 2010). For them, the enclosures do not necessarily come from the city, since their 
aim is not to paint a picture of bad governance by the DA. Their only aim is to overcome the 
racism in South Africa and recover their pride as black people. 
 
However, it is not racism behind the provision of open toilets. It is neo-liberalism spread in 
South African policies that made it happen. The city’s project to provide open toilets to be 
enclosed by the residents, which Helen Zille called “a valid public-private partnership 
between the city and a community”, is a tricky one (Zille, 2010, January 28). As we discussed 
in Chapter 1, the real public participation is actually undermined and civil society is placed in 
a subordinate position to political society under the recent neo-liberal policies being 
implemented in South Africa. This toilet issue is not an exception, and reflects the flaw of 
neo-liberal policies. And the fact that the DA is in a ruling position in the City Council and in 
the Western Cape makes the situation more complicated and reminiscent of apartheid. 
  
When I interviewed Nolufefe Gexa, the councillor of Ward 95, she told me how the city’s 
project was top-down and how little she could do for her constituency. She attends the 
meetings of Sub-Council 10 (Charlotte Maxeke) once a month, which consists of five wards 
including Ward 95. Her job is to represent the interests of Ward 95 and to give her 
constituency feedback of the meetings. The Ward 95 Development Forum takes place once a 
week, and she is called for other meetings with the residents when necessary. Asked about 
open toilets, she answered: 
 
Of course people did not agree and I did not agree either. But I could not do anything. 
I just report back what the city said during the meeting. The city just wants 












councillor. But I am not a decision maker or on implementation side, so I cannot do 
anything. The city officials just come and make toilets without enclosures (N. Gexa, 
personal communication, 15 November 2010). 
 
What she said gives a vivid description of “top-down” mechanism of policy implementation 
in Cape Town. Indeed, when I observed one of the Sub-Council 10 meetings in November, I 
came across a similar situation. At that time, the city officials presented their plan, which 
intended to charge informal traders tariffs for taking public spaces for their business. The 
chairperson, Stuart Pringle, emphasised the importance of discussing tariffs. He said, “This is 
an important issue. The city is charging your communities. This is obviously public 
participation process” (S. Pringle, personal communication, 15 November 2010). After a 
brief explanation by Pringle, a report by the city officials on their research about the 
situations of informal traders in Sub-Council 10 and the reasonable rate of tariffs followed. 
Gexa raised a strong objection to this plan, saying, “People cannot pay the money. We must 
not charge them money” (N. Gexa, personal communication, 15 November 2010). Then 
Pringle answered, “I can agree with the principle, but then where is the money coming from? 
Given the report by the officials, affordability issue is taken into account. Do you recommend 
other wards should pay for it? We can do that if you want. It is not impossible” (S Pringle, 
personal communication, 15 November 2010). Then Gexa answered, “I cannot agree as a 
councillor, as the Ward 95 Development Forum, but I cannot do anything” (N. Gexa, 
personal communication, 15 November 2010). 
 
Of course, complaints are inevitable when the government tries to charge taxes or tariffs, but 
the case above is a good example of the practice of cost recovery caused by neo-liberal 
policies. The city officials tried to justify the plan by using the term “public participation”, 
but the truth is that the residents are charged money without being involved in decision-
making. Although the city officials might have conducted research on the affordability of 
tariffs on informal traders, it was only sampled investigation and “the poorest of the poor” 
will not be able to afford it, as was the case with the open toilet issue. We can easily 













Even though the shift to neo-liberalism was actually made by the ANC, together with the 
“explicit and very ‘bullish’ neo-liberal position” by the DA, whose leader is a white lady, the 
toilet issue causes disputes concerning racism amongst the residents in Khayelitsha 
(McDonald & Smith, 2004:1473). Some ANCYL members also called the DA racist, but this 
was more part of a wider strategy to undermine the DA for partisan purposes than level any 
serious accusations of racism. The strong emergence of “black consciousness” amongst the 
residents in Zone 14 is in line with the discussion in Chapter 1. Race is still an integral part of 
identity for the people in the Western Cape, especially under specific circumstances: “in the 
presence of ignorance and extended racialised socialisation, in the presence of 
marginalisation and lack of alternative sources of pride and self-esteem, and in the presence 
of enduring  economic  deprivation”  (Bekker  et  al.,  2000:234). This may not exactly be the 
same as “black civil society” or “ethnic sectionalism”, for they do not necessarily exclude 
and attack the interests of other races. Nevertheless, the persistence of their “black 
consciousness” caused the decision to demand concrete rather than corrugated structures for 
their toilets, which in turn left the human rights and dignity of “the poorest of the poor” in 
Zone 14 violated. In addition, their rage against racism drove the protests in to becoming 





Protests for civil rights in South Africa represent only one aspect of the ‘toilet war’. There are 
people working to maintain the civil rights of the poor and marginalised, but there are others 
who are more concerned with issues of politics or pride in their identity as black South 
Africans.  But  the  end  result  remains  that  the  “poorest  of  the  poor”  are  still deserted by 
democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, and the rage against the legacy of 
apartheid. Ironically, democratic and participatory processes of decision-making in the small 
community contribute toward ignoring the voices of the poorest of the poor, who are still the 
minority there. The partisan purpose and the rage against racism restrict the interest of the 
poorest of the poor, too. We also find a subtle but critical difference between the ANCYL, 
who commands the ‘toilet war’, and the residents in Zone 14, who follow them. Since it is 












the residents in Zone14 are for the ANC as a political party or as an anti-apartheid apparatus. 
Yet, whilst the ANCYL aims to portrait a picture which shows bad governance by the DA, 
the residents in Zone 14 are fighting against the racism from which they suffered in the past. 
This disjuncture makes it difficult to seek for the alternative to making the city provide the 
concrete enclosures. At any rate, whether it is associational activities like community 
meetings or direct action like protests, civil society can reflect and reproduce many of the 

















Using the survey data, this chapter identifies the correlates of participation in civil society so 
that we can infer why people participate. Specifically, I examine the correlation between 
some possible motivations to participate (income, demographic backgrounds, grievances with 
service delivery, grievances relating to the neighbourhood, political attitude, attitude towards 
neighbourhood, and psychological resources) and actual participation, so as to assess the 
relative importance of these different motivations. Firstly the distribution of grievances, 
including by race and class, is considered using descriptive statistics. As we reviewed in 
Chapter 1, income and grievances are considered to be the general motivation to participate 
in civil society in South Africa, so this descriptive analysis is important. Then I use 






The Cape Area Study 2005 (CAS 2005) is a survey of aspects of “diversity and inequality” in 
the South African city of Cape Town (Seekings, Jooste, Langer, & Maughan-Brown, 2005:5). 
Sampling was designed to generate a representative sample of 1200 adults spread across 
metropolitan Cape Town (Seekings et al., 2005:16). The representativeness of the realised 
sample is not even, so weights are needed if the results are to be adjusted so that they are 













Using CAS 2005, three variables are selected or constructed as  measures  of  people’s 
participation in civil society7: D1.1_C – whether a respondent is a member or involved in a 
community-based group, e.g. neighbourhood watch or street committee; D39 – whether a 
respondent attended a community meeting during the past year; and a composite variable of 
D42, D44 and D45 – whether a respondent attended one of a demonstration, protest march, a 
boycott or a strike (which are collectively referred to  as  “protests”)  during the past year. 
Regarding a community-based group, only those who have membership are selected. 
Respondents who answered in D1.2_C “take part in activities  but  not  a  member” are 
excluded, in order to distinguish the difference between membership of organisation and 
mere participation in a community meeting or protests (the same thing applies to D1.1_A and 
D1.1_B, i.e. participation in a religious organisation and in a political party, which are used 
as explanatory variables later). 
 
In CAS 2005, 11% (N=124) of the sample have membership of a community-based group, 
33% (N=391) attended a community meeting and 14% (N=167) joined at least one of the 
protests during the past year (these data are exclusive of people who answered “Don’t know”). 
Attending a community meeting is the most popular form of participation, according to CAS 
2005 data. 
 
As explanatory variables, several groups of variables are selected from CAS 2005. There are 
so many possible variables regarded as reasons for participation in civil society that the 
variables having no significant bivariate relationship with dependent variables are omitted. 
This is the case unless there are good reasons to believe that we need to control for them or 
they are of general interest. Also, if one variable is correlated with another variable, the more 
relevant variable is selected. 
 
First of all, grievances and income are crucial explanatory variables in this analysis since 
those are generally considered as strong reasons for people to participate in protests in South 
Africa. Ngwane (2010) acknowledges two possible causes of protests: an economic factor, 
                                                 












which is retrieved from the existence  of  “service  delivery”  problems  attributed  to  the 
weaknesses of local government; and a political factor, which comes from poor governance 
and a deficient democracy (Ngwane, 2010). CAS 2005 contains a wide range of possible 
variables for grievances, and three groups of grievances are defined in accordance with 
Ngwane’s  argument. One group is grievances about service delivery by the government 
(C28-C31, C33-C36, G23), another is grievances over the performance of politicians (C10-11, 
C41-42), and the other is grievances over problems in the neighbourhood (D22.1-6, C32), 
although Ngwane has not mentioned the impact of the latter in protests. If  Ngwane’s 
argument is true, it is assumed that these variables have a strong correlation with dependent 
variables, especially with the variable for protests. 
 
There are five ways of measuring income status of the respondents in CAS 2005. The 
respondents were asked how rich or poor they were, “relative to other people in South Africa” 
(B7). They were also asked which social class they think they are in, their monthly individual 
income, as well as monthly household income (F6, G16, G21). B7  (which  I  call  “relative 
income”)  is  asked  in a scale of 0 to 10 but to compare with other income variables, five 
categories are set for this variable. Since the N of monthly individual income is too small 
(N=478, excluding “Don’t know”) to be used in a proper analysis, only monthly household 
income (N=947, excluding “Don’t know”) will be included. In addition, CAS 2005 calculates 
neighbourhood income on the basis of data on household incomes from the Population 
Census 2001, at the level of the local government ward. Neighbourhoods included in CAS 
2005 sample can be divided into five neighbourhood income quintiles (NIQ), and a higher 
NIQ number represents richer NIQ. Seekings and Matisonn (2006) show that NIQ is in 
proportion to respondents’ self-recognition of their relative income, as well as to self-reported 
social class. That is, the richer their NIQ is, the richer they categorise themselves. You can 
see that there is also a proportionate relationship between NIQ and monthly household 
income from Table 4.1. As with NIQ’s relationships with relative income and social class, the 
higher the respondents’ monthly household income is, the richer their neighbourhood income 
quintiles become. One note is that in NIQ 1 the most frequent monthly household income 
category is R1001-3000, not the poorest one, R0-1000. Figures 4.1-4 are histograms of each 
income variable. Although  the  frequency of  “upper  class”  in  social  class  is  very  small  and 
NIQ is differently distributed from other variables, I use these variables as they are and 



























   NIQ1  NIQ2  NIQ3  NIQ4  NIQ5  Total 
R0 ‐ 1,000  36%  26%  13%  13%  1%  20% 
R1,001 ‐ 3,000  43%  38%  25%  25%  11%  30% 
R3,001 ‐ 5,000  17%  26%  27%  25%  19%  22% 
R5,001 ‐ 10,000  3%  9%  30%  27%  28%  18% 
More than R10,000  1%  1%  5%  10%  41%  10% 


































































Political attitudes and religious attitudes are selected as other explanatory variables. It is 
important to see if political and religious attitudes are alternative or complementary to civil 
society. Political attitudes consist of the variables asking whether respondents think politics is 
“very important” (B3.4), whether they participate in a political party (D1.1_B), whether they 
pay attention to what is happening in government and politics “most of the time” (C2), and an 
index of how often the respondents voted in the national elections and the elections for the 
Cape Town City Council (C26 and C45). There is only one variable for religious attitudes 
that has significant relationship with dependent variables, that is, whether they participate in a 
religious organisation (D1.1_A). As stated before, regarding participation in a political party 
and a religious organisation, the respondents who do not have membership are excluded from 
analysis. Another group of explanatory variables is psychological resources. The selected 
variables are those who  feel  they  are  “totally  in  control”  or  “mostly  in  control”  over what 
happens in their lives (B2.2), whether they “strongly agree” with the statement “If you had to, 
you would be able to get together with other people and make elected leaders listen” (C20), 
and those who think they can influence decisions taken by the Cape Town City Council “a lot” 
(C22). The causality of dependent variables and psychological resources is uncertain because 
these could be the consequence – not the cause – of participation in civil society. However, 
these psychological resources are important when you examine what civil society means for 
people, hence they are included. 
 
Finally, several variables for demographics and attitudes towards neighbourhood are chosen. 
Variables for demographics are gender (G4), race (F5)8, age (G3), education (G6), whether 
the respondent is head of household or not (G1), whether the respondent is working or not 
(G11), and living length in the neighbourhood9 (D16). As far as a community-based group or 
a community meeting is concerned, how long people reside in the same neighbourhood can 
be considered as one of the important factors in participation. Also, whether or not the head 
of a household is related to responsibility or power, which could be another factor in 
participation too. Working status has two sides – whether one has time for participation and 
whether one has grievances. If one is working, he or she might not have time to participate, 
                                                 
8  This is the report how people were or would have been classified under apartheid, and 
Asians/Indians and others are excluded because their sample number is too small. 












and considering the high unemployment rate in South Africa, it can be assumed that those 
who have a job have fewer grievances than those who are not working. People who are not 
working may have more grievances in their lives and also more time to take part in civil 
society. 
 
Attitudes towards neighbourhood can play an important role when a community-based group 
and a community meeting are concerned. The variables chosen are those asking whether 
respondents  think  the neighbourhood  in which  they  live  is  “very  important”  (B3.7)  and  an 
index  for  how much  respondents  agree  with  the  sentiment  “most  people  who  live  in  this 
neighbourhood  can  be  trusted”  (D.13).  It  is  assumed  that  the more important a person 
considers his or her neighbourhood and the more one trusts his or her neighbours, the higher 
the rate of participation in community activities can be. 
 
Using these explanatory variables, simple tabulation can tell us many things about dependent 
variables. Also, the relationship amongst the explanatory variables should be sought for. 





Now using the descriptive analysis we look at who is participating in civil society. CAS 2005 
asked the following questions about the racial and cultural composition of the civil society 
organisations in which people participated.  
 
D5.1  Do  most  members  of  this  group  come  from  the  same  neighbourhood  or  do  they  come  from 
different neighbourhoods? 














D5.4 Are most members of  this group  in  the same  racial or population group, or do  they come  from 
different racial / population groups? 
 
These questions are useful to look at whether people are participating in cross-cultural, cross-
class, and cross-racial organisations or not. Table 4.2 reveals that most members of 
organisations have different incomes and educations, but one-third of the respondents 
answered they were from the same neighbourhood, and half the respondents answered they 
were from the same racial/population group. In any organisation, and regardless of 
respondents’ race, more or less half the respondents answered they were from the same race. 
This fact already shows that people are not participating in civil society purely because of 
their grievances or poorness. 
 
Table 4.2 Composition of the civil society organisations 
   The same  Different  Don't know 
Neighbourhood  32%  67%  1% 
Incomes  8%  86%  6% 
Educations  7%  89%  4% 







No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Community‐
based group 
No  ‐  ‐  94%  78%  91%  79% 
Yes  ‐  ‐  6%  22%  9%  21% 
Total  ‐  ‐  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Community 
meeting 
No  72%  35%  ‐  ‐  72%  40% 
Yes  28%  65%  ‐  ‐  28%  60% 
Total  100%  100%  ‐  ‐  100%  100% 
Protests 
No  88%  72%  92%  74%  ‐  ‐ 
Yes  12%  28%  8%  26%  ‐  ‐ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  ‐  ‐ 
Total  89%  11%  67%  33%  86%  14% 
Notes:  Answers  "Refused"  and  "Don't  know"  were  excluded.  The  variable  for  community‐based 














Table 4.3 shows that there is a high correlation amongst those three variables. In particular, 
more than half of those who have membership in a community-based group, as well as more 
than half of those who joined protests, attended a community meeting during the past year 
(the values highlighted). All the three variables are correlated with one another, and attending 
a community meeting seems to be the most popular form of participation amongst them. This 
is not surprising because one can assume that it is the members of a community-based group 
who organise a community meeting, and that people should have a community meeting 









    ‐Male  11%  30%  15% 
    ‐Female  10%  34%  13% 
Race: 
    ‐Black  19%  49%  18% 
    ‐Coloured  4%  24%  16% 
    ‐White  8%  22%  4% 
Head of household or not 
    ‐Head  13%  36%  14% 
    ‐Not head  7%  26%  14% 
Working status 
    ‐Working (full/part time)  13%  31%  16% 
    ‐Not working  9%  33%  12% 
Living length in the neighbourhood 
    ‐Less than a year  13%  29%  5% 
    ‐1 to 5 years  10%  35%  11% 
    ‐6 to 10 years  9%  35%  14% 
    ‐More than 10 years  12%  32%  16% 
    ‐Since birth  7%  31%  20% 

















Table 4.4 shows the relationship between dependent variables and demographics. There is a 
subtle gender gap in participation. Whilst males are more likely to join community-based 
group and protests, females are more likely to attend a community meeting. Black people are 
most active in terms of participation in any activities, but when it comes to protests coloured 
people are as active as black people, whilst they are least likely to be members of a 
community-based group. Heads of household attend community meetings significantly more 
than community-based group or protests, their attendance of which is almost identical. What 
is distinctive is the result with working status. Initially, I assumed that people who have a job 
have fewer grievances and do not have time either, so that they are less likely to participate in 
civil society. However, the result shows more people with a job take part in a community-
based group and protests than those who are unemployed. Community meetings are attended 
equally by the employed and unemployed. There is no significant relationship between living 
length and a community-based group or a community meeting, but as far as protests are 
concerned, it seems that the longer people live in the same neighbourhood, the more often 
they join protests. 
 
Figures 4.5-10 show the predicted (fitted) probability and mean values of each dependent 
variable by age and by education. You can see that the relationship is not linear when you 
compare the scattered mean values with the lined predicted probability. Participation first 
rises and then falls with age. Regarding completed level of education, only a community 
meeting has significant relationship with education. It can be assumed that people with higher 
education have fewer grievances so are less likely to participate, but it is not clear why only a 
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Now we take a look at participation in civil society based on people’s  incomes. Table 4.5 
shows the percentage of people participating in each activity within each income category. 
More or less monthly household income and NIQ show a pattern that the poorer people are, 
the more often they partake in activities, which is in line with my hypothesis. Self-assessed 
incomes – relative income and social class – are difficult to interpret, and especially relative 
income seems to have no explainable pattern of relationship with any activities. A community 
meeting has an obvious relationship with social class: the lower their social class is, the more 
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    0 ‐ 2 (very poor)  15%  43%  16% 
    3 ‐ 4 (poor)  8%  30%  15% 
    5 (average)  9%  28%  12% 
    6 ‐ 7 (rich)  11%  37%  16% 
    8 ‐ 10 (very rich)  19%  32%  19% 
Self classification of social class 
    Lower class  16%  44%  14% 
    Working class  10%  32%  19% 
    Middle class  7%  26%  8% 
    Upper class  16%  16%  16% 
Monthly household income 
    R0 ‐ 1,000 (poorest)  15%  50%  17% 
    R1,001 ‐ 3,000 (poor)  14%  39%  14% 
    R3,001 ‐ 5,000 (average)  10%  28%  15% 
    R5,001 ‐ 10,000 (rich)  10%  24%  15% 
    More than R10,000 (richest)  13%  28%  8% 
Neighbourhood income quintiles (NIQ) 
    NIQ1 (poorest)  19%  46%  19% 
    NIQ2 (poor)  12%  35%  20% 
    NIQ3 (average)  7%  28%  17% 
    NIQ4 (rich)  4%  30%  9% 
    NIQ5 (richest)  10%  20%  4% 




These data show the possibility that demographics, especially race, and absolute incomes, i.e. 
monthly household income and NIQ, can be highly but unevenly correlated with dependent 
variables. We have to bear in mind that Cape Town has a distinctive and substantive overlap 
between  race  and  income:  the  black  minority  is  “overwhelmingly  poor”,  and  the  white 
minority  is  “overwhelmingly  affluent”,  whilst  the  coloured  people  “spans  the  range  from 
poor to rich” (Seekings & Matisonn, 2006:6). The next section examines whether this fact is 

















   Black  Coloured  White  Total 
Self evaluation of richness relative to other South Africans (relative income) 
    0 ‐ 2 (very poor)  63%  32%  5%  100% 
    3 ‐ 4 (poor)  33%  51%  16%  100% 
    5 (average)  26%  49%  25%  100% 
    6 ‐ 7 (rich)  30%  25%  45%  100% 
    8 ‐ 10 (very rich)  37%  28%  35%  100% 
Self classification of social class 
    Lower class  75%  24%  1%  100% 
    Working class  29%  54%  17%  100% 
    Middle class  14%  41%  45%  100% 
    Upper class  18%  23%  59%  100% 
Monthly household income 
    R0 ‐ 1,000 (poorest)  69%  29%  2%  100% 
    R1,001 ‐ 3,000 (poor)  59%  37%  4%  100% 
    R3,001 ‐ 5,000 (average)  36%  48%  16%  100% 
    R5,001 ‐ 10,000 (rich)  8%  57%  35%  100% 
    More than R10,000 (richest)  6%  28%  66%  100% 
Neighbourhood income quintiles (NIQ) 
    NIQ1 (most poor)  84%  15%  1%  100% 
    NIQ2 (poor)  47%  53%  0%  100% 
    NIQ3 (average)  13%  87%  0%  100% 
    NIQ4 (rich)  11%  58%  31%  100% 
    NIQ5 (most rich)  12%  8%  80%  100% 






Table 4.6 shows the racial composition of each income variable. The data are in line with 
general common knowledge about Cape Town: black people are concentrated in poorer 
categories, white people are in richer categories, and coloured people are around the middle. 
The NIQ, especially, shows an intensive pattern of this fact. Relative income shows a weaker 
relationship with race compared to other income variables. More black people consider 
themselves to be richer, whilst more white people consider themselves to be poorer. This 
means that black people do not regard themselves as poor as much as white people do, in 
spite of the actual income difference between them. This implies white people are more likely 












more  likely  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  “Cape Town’s  poor  are  not  poor  in  national  terms” 
(Seekings & Matisonn, 2006:6). In any event, we can conclude that CAS 2005 reflects the 
general fact that there is a relationship between race and incomes in Cape Town. 
 
The next question, then, is how are grievances related to race and incomes? From what we 
have investigated so far, you could easily assume that poorer people, who are 
overwhelmingly black, can have more grievances than richer people, that is, the majority of 
white people. Table 4.7 displays the weighted data of grievances by race. Overall, black 
people have the most grievances amongst them as expected, but some variables have opposite 
patterns. For instance, white people are most dissatisfied with the minibus taxi, bus and train 
services, and with the performance of the Mayor Nomaindia Mfeketo. They are followed by 
coloured people. The ANC was unusually in power in the City Council when CAS 2005 was 
conducted, so this might have affected the assessment of the Mayor by white people (even 
though this is not reflected in the assessment of the Provincial Premier Ebrahim Rasool). 
When you look at coloured people, they are distinctively dissatisfied with their cars being 
broken into or stolen, poor recreational facilities or roads, police, and the performance of the 
President Thabo Mbeki. Regarding political grievances, we cannot say that black people have 
specifically more grievances than coloured or white people. Their grievances are 
concentrated on neighbourhood problems or government service delivery, and notably more 
than half of black people do not have any flush toilet in their houses, whilst almost all 
coloured people and white people have at least one. When you look at the  Pearson’s  chi-
squared probability, there is no significant relationship with public health clinics or hospitals, 
as well as with the Premier. This suggests that there should be no difference in having 















Black  Coloured  White  Pearson chi2 probability 
Neighbourhood problems 
  ‐Drunks, vagrants or beggars  76%  63%  49%  0.00 
  ‐Homes broken into  71%  64%  52%  0.00 
  ‐Cars broken into or stolen  54%  61%  52%  0.03 
  ‐Poor recreational facilities or roads  31%  55%  15%  0.00 
  ‐Gangs  62%  36%  5%  0.00 
  ‐Noisy neighbours or parties  78%  45%  20%  0.00 
  ‐Minibus taxi  37%  59%  81%  0.00 
Dissatisfaction with government service delivery 
  ‐Electricity  39%  16%  6%  0.00 
  ‐Water  36%  14%  11%  0.00 
  ‐Public health clinics or hospitals  59%  59%  55%  0.50 
  ‐Bus and train  39%  49%  68%  0.00 
  ‐Police  35%  51%  28%  0.00 
  ‐Road repairs and construction  45%  40%  29%  0.00 
  ‐Housing  63%  56%  40%  0.00 
  ‐Refuse collection  43%  14%  10%  0.00 
  ‐No flush toilet in house  57%  1%  0%  0.00 
Political grievances 
  ‐President Mbeki performs badly  10%  19%  13%  0.00 
  ‐Premier Rasool performs badly  6%  7%  9%  0.28 
  ‐Mayor Mfeketo performs badly  7%  8%  18%  0.00 
  ‐Ward councillor performs badly  27%  30%  9%  0.00 






Table 4.8-11 report weighted data of grievances by each of the income variables. Although 
there is a small difference amongst the results by each income variable, the data show similar 
kinds of result as were seen in the data of grievances by race. Generally, the poorer people 
are, the more grievances they have. Richer people, most of whom are white, are more likely 
to complain about transport. People in the middle income categories, most of whom are 
coloured, are more likely to have problems with cars being broken into or stolen, poor 
recreational facilities or roads, and police. One remarkable thing is that political grievances 
tend to have no significant relationship with income variables, according to each of Pearson’s 












more of those income variables, the relationship with income variables does not seem to be as 
strong as the relationship with race. This implies that race still plays a key role in politics of 
post-apartheid South Africa, at least for Capetonians. But when it comes to the performance 
of ward councillors, who are directly involved in government service delivery, incomes are 
more  important  to explain peoples’ assessment of them. Finally, there is the case of people 
who have no flush toilet in their houses yet do not consider themselves to be poor. This 
demonstrates the point that people do not define their overall standard of wealth based on 
whether or not there is a flush toilet in their home. 
 
These results so far show that there is a significant relationship between race and incomes in 
CAS 2005. Also, grievances are highly correlated with both race and incomes. However, the 
pattern of relationship between race and grievances and between incomes and grievances are 
more or less similar, so we cannot tell which have more influence on grievances. We can say 
that political grievances are more likely to be related with race than with income, but still we 
need to control race and incomes altogether, as well as grievances, to see why people get 
































  ‐Drunks, vagrants or beggars  71%  69%  62%  60%  47%  0.00 
  ‐Homes broken into  74%  66%  60%  61%  44%  0.00 
  ‐Cars broken into or stolen  57%  65%  56%  53%  28%  0.00 
  ‐Poor recreational facilities or roads  48%  44%  38%  16%  23%  0.00 
  ‐Gangs  56%  34%  36%  19%  28%  0.00 
  ‐Noisy neighbours or parties  64%  55%  48%  42%  38%  0.00 
  ‐Minibus taxi  53%  55%  52%  54%  48%  0.86 
Dissatisfaction with government service delivery 
  ‐Electricity  40%  23%  15%  14%  21%  0.00 
  ‐Water  34%  22%  17%  16%  22%  0.00 
  ‐Public health clinics or hospitals  66%  63%  51%  58%  47%  0.00 
  ‐Bus and train  48%  54%  43%  53%  44%  0.04 
  ‐Police  41%  48%  37%  36%  30%  0.02 
  ‐Road repairs and construction  48%  45%  37%  26%  34%  0.00 
  ‐Housing  67%  60%  48%  56%  47%  0.00 
  ‐Refuse collection  36%  24%  18%  23%  15%  0.00 
  ‐No flush toilet in house  37%  22%  14%  15%  22%  0.00 
Political grievances 
  ‐President Mbeki performs badly  14%  14%  15%  12%  14%  0.94 
  ‐Premier Rasool performs badly  6%  8%  8%  4%  2%  0.43 
  ‐Mayor Mfeketo performs badly  8%  9%  10%  12%  8%  0.90 
  ‐Ward councillor performs badly  33%  33%  19%  15%  8%  0.00 





























  ‐Drunks, vagrants or beggars  75%  62%  57%  79%  0.00 
  ‐Homes broken into  68%  64%  57%  72%  0.02 
  ‐Cars broken into or stolen  54%  59%  53%  53%  0.29 
  ‐Poor recreational facilities or roads  40%  42%  31%  17%  0.00 
  ‐Gangs  63%  33%  21%  27%  0.00 
  ‐Noisy neighbours or parties  73%  51%  37%  21%  0.00 
  ‐Minibus taxi  40%  57%  61%  53%  0.00 
Dissatisfaction with government service delivery 
  ‐Electricity  39%  19%  12%  16%  0.00 
  ‐Water  37%  17%  15%  21%  0.00 
  ‐Public health clinics or hospitals  58%  61%  55%  67%  0.37 
  ‐Bus and train  37%  50%  55%  67%  0.00 
  ‐Police  32%  47%  36%  42%  0.00 
  ‐Road repairs and construction  44%  41%  32%  35%  0.01 
  ‐Housing  61%  56%  51%  44%  0.03 
  ‐Refuse collection  39%  19%  16%  16%  0.00 
  ‐No flush toilet in house  48%  17%  5%  11%  0.00 
Political grievances 
  ‐President Mbeki performs badly  14%  14%  13%  50%  0.00 
  ‐Premier Rasool performs badly  6%  6%  8%  24%  0.04 
  ‐Mayor Mfeketo performs badly  7%  8%  14%  27%  0.02 
  ‐Ward councillor performs badly  25%  26%  20%  25%  0.60 

































  ‐Drunks, vagrants or beggars  81%  72%  60%  62%  50%  0.00 
  ‐Homes broken into  67%  70%  64%  65%  68%  0.64 
  ‐Cars broken into or stolen  54%  61%  59%  63%  58%  0.53 
  ‐Poor recreational facilities or roads  39%  41%  42%  40%  23%  0.02 
  ‐Gangs  63%  57%  42%  22%  7%  0.00 
  ‐Noisy neighbours or parties  73%  68%  55%  36%  25%  0.00 
  ‐Minibus taxi  37%  48%  53%  64%  76%  0.00 
Dissatisfaction with government service delivery 
  ‐Electricity  36%  34%  20%  12%  5%  0.00 
  ‐Water  34%  29%  20%  12%  9%  0.00 
  ‐Public health clinics or hospitals  54%  60%  55%  63%  61%  0.45 
  ‐Bus and train  37%  44%  50%  55%  71%  0.00 
  ‐Police  34%  42%  34%  46%  37%  0.07 
  ‐Road repairs and construction  46%  47%  38%  39%  30%  0.02 
  ‐Housing  65%  64%  52%  49%  41%  0.00 
  ‐Refuse collection  38%  32%  21%  13%  13%  0.00 
  ‐No flush toilet in house  45%  38%  17%  2%  0%  0.00 
Political grievances 
  ‐President Mbeki performs badly  18%  13%  15%  14%  11%  0.47 
  ‐Premier Rasool performs badly  10%  6%  8%  5%  8%  0.48 
  ‐Mayor Mfeketo performs badly  10%  12%  6%  9%  15%  0.35 
  ‐Ward councillor performs badly  26%  32%  24%  11%  10%  0.00 























  ‐Drunks, vagrants or beggars  78%  68%  65%  61%  45%  0.00 
  ‐Homes broken into  77%  61%  66%  63%  48%  0.00 
  ‐Cars broken into or stolen  59%  52%  58%  63%  46%  0.00 
  ‐Poor recreational facilities or roads  37%  43%  50%  49%  11%  0.00 
  ‐Gangs  63%  53%  37%  30%  5%  0.00 
  ‐Noisy neighbours or parties  78%  55%  48%  47%  21%  0.00 
  ‐Minibus taxi  36%  50%  62%  63%  65%  0.00 
Dissatisfaction with government service delivery 
  ‐Electricity  41%  19%  24%  17%  6%  0.00 
  ‐Water  34%  19%  18%  20%  12%  0.00 
  ‐Public health clinics or hospitals  57%  63%  61%  57%  51%  0.14 
  ‐Bus and train  38%  44%  52%  52%  59%  0.00 
  ‐Police  39%  38%  58%  40%  26%  0.00 
  ‐Road repairs and construction  51%  39%  43%  34%  27%  0.00 
  ‐Housing  68%  54%  61%  51%  37%  0.00 
  ‐Refuse collection  44%  18%  21%  15%  12%  0.00 
  ‐No flush toilet in house  56%  14%  11%  8%  3%  0.00 
Political grievances 
  ‐President Mbeki performs badly  12%  12%  25%  10%  13%  0.00 
  ‐Premier Rasool performs badly  6%  9%  9%  5%  7%  0.55 
  ‐Mayor Mfeketo performs badly  8%  8%  8%  9%  16%  0.11 
  ‐Ward councillor performs badly  26%  22%  41%  17%  15%  0.00 







Multiple probit regression models are run for three dependent variables: a community-based 
group, a community meeting, and protests. Firstly, models are tested without any income 
variables, and then the effects of each income variable are inspected. To avoid the problem of 
collinearity, indices are constructed for each group of grievances, which I call the 
Neighbourhood Problems Index (NPI; values 0 to 7), the Service Delivery Grievances Index 
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PGI
Source: CAS2005
grievances are not statistically correlated to one another, but conditional correlations are 
thought to exist. However, when we look at histograms of each index (Figures 4.11-13), even 
though the distribution of NPI and SDGI are more or less acceptable to use in analysis, it is 
not eligible to use PGI, given its highly skewed distribution. So, instead of PGI, a composite 
variable is used to measure grievances against politics. Since most variables used are dummy 
variables, probit regression is used for the analysis. In most cases, variables are omitted from 
the models if they are of no importance. Some are included despite there being no significant 
relationship with the dependent variable, if there are good reasons to believe that we need to 
control for them or they are of general interest. Correlation coefficients of explanatory 
variables are shown in Appendix 2. 
 






































Female  Not sig     Not sig     Not sig    
Black  .08***  .03  .12***  .05  Not sig    
Coloured  Not sig     Not sig     .10**  .04 
Age  <.01***  <.01  Not sig     Not sig    
No work  ‐.05***  .02  Not sig     Not sig    
Living length (values from 1 to 5)  Not sig     Not sig     .03**  .01 
Attitude towards neighbourhood 
Neighbours can be trusted 
(values from 1 to 5)  .02**  .01  Not sig     Not sig    
Political attitudes 
Politics is important  Not sig     Not sig     Not sig    
Political party  .09**  .05  .25***  .07  Not sig    
Pay attention to politics  Not sig     .11***  .04  Not sig    
Vote (values from 0 to 2)  Not sig     .07***  .03  Not sig    
Religious attitude 
Religious organisation  Not sig     .12***  .04  .06**  .02 
Psychological resources 
Can get together and make elected 
leaders listen  .14***  .05  Not sig     .07**  .04 
Can influence decisions by the city a lot  .06**  .03  Not sig     Not sig    
High control in life  .06***  .01  Not sig     Not sig    
Grievances 
Neighbourhood problems 
(values from 0 to 7)  .01**  <.01  Not sig     .02***  .01 
Service delivery grievances 
(values from 0 to 9)  Not sig     Not sig     .01***  <.01 
Political grievance (composite)  Not sig     Not sig     Not sig    
Pseudo R2  0.29  0.15  0.11 




Table 4.12 shows the results of multivariate ‘dprobit’ regression models on each dependent 
variable without any income variables. Each dependent variable is correlated with different 
groups of explanatory variables. A community-based group is more correlated with 
psychological resources, whilst a community meeting is more correlated with political 
attitudes. Protests are the only variable that correlated with both neighbourhood problems and 
service delivery grievances, even though the coefficients are not so large. Black people 














What is distinctive about a community-based group is its high correlation with the variables 
for psychological resources. The causality is not clear, but we can say that being a member of 
a  community meeting  has  something  to  do with  people’s  confidence  and positive mindset. 
People who are members of a community-based group believe that they have influence on the 
government, and that they have control over their lives. The same kind of thing can be said 
about protests, even though only one variable of psychological resources is correlated with 
them. 
 
A community meeting is not related with any psychological resources or grievances, but is 
highly correlated with political attitudes and religious attitude. We can assume that whether 
people attend a community meeting is the matter of their behavioural patterns, and those who 
attend a community meeting can be regarded as “active black”, who are also likely to join a 
political party, a religious organisation, as well as go to vote frequently. Otherwise, a 
community meeting can be highly politicised activity, considering the high coefficient of 
“political party”. 
 
What is interesting about protests is their correlation with coloured people and with living 
length. Whilst other dependent variables are only correlated with black people, protests are 
correlated with coloured people. This could be related with the fact that more coloured people 
are employed than black peopl  in Cape Town. If they are working, the opportunities to join a 
strike or a boycott should increase. Protests have no correlation with any political attitudes, 
and they are not related with political grievances either. This means protests are more likely 
to be carried out for expressing their grievances, not for politicking. Again, a religious 
organisation is complementary to protests. 
  
Now, what happens if we add income variables to these models? Tables 4.13-15 show that 
the models continue to produce different results for the three dependent variables when we 
include income variables also. The highest categories are dropped from each income variable, 













The first striking result is that participation in a community-based group is negatively 
correlated with monthly household income. This means that poorer people are less likely to 
join a community-based group, controlling race and other variables. This could be the reason 
why it is negatively correlated with people who are not working. Now we can see that black 
people who have a job and are not amongst the most poor are more likely to be a member of a 
community-based group. What should be concerning is that the N of the result with monthly 
household income is overwhelmingly small and that there is no correlation with NIQ, but still 
it is correlated with two categories of relative income. Other variables than incomes show 
almost the same results as models without incomes, and it is not overstatement to say that 
being a member of a community-based group is associated with the people’s confidence  in 
their lives or self-reliance in their role in society. 
 
The results of a community meeting did not change very much from Table 4.12. Even though 
monthly household income negated an effect of “being black”, the N is very small and other 
income variables do not show any similar patterns. It is safer just to say that “active black” 
are likely to attend a community meeting, or a community meeting is highly politicised 
activity. 
 
Another remarkable notion can be made for the results with protests. Although only NIQ1 is 
correlated with protests, the effect of race disappeared when income variables were added, 
and  the  effect  of  “politics  is  important”  turned  out  to  be  significant.  This  fact poses a 
possibility that protests might  not  be  pure  expression  of  people’s grievances but somehow 
can be related to politics. Also, the coefficients of the variable “can get  together and make 
elected leaders listen” are increased, so protests can also be related to people’s confidence or 
self-reliance in their role in society. 
 
The effect of incomes are not as strong as expected, whilst  “being  black”  is  an  important 
reason for being part of a community-based group and a community meeting. Conversely, a 
community-based  group  is more  “pro-non-poor”,  and  highly  correlated with  psychological 
resources. A community meeting has almost no significant relationship with grievances or 












community meeting is a highly politicised activity or for “active black” people. Protests are 
only correlated with NIQ1, but the disappearance of the effects of race implies that protests 
are more related to income than race. Grievances consistently play an important role in 
protests, and psychological resources have also positively related with protests. In any model, 
political attitudes are always one of the key explanatory variables, and this testifies that civil 





Overall, CAS 2005 shows that participation in civil society is not correlated that much to 
incomes and grievances. Participation in civil society is not necessarily the channel for the 
poor to express their grievances. Rather, variables such as race, political attitudes, and 
psychological resources are more correlated with participation. This is particularly true with 
associational activities like community-based groups and community meetings. Cape Town is 
said to have a substantial overlap between race and income, and the descriptive statistics 
show that CAS 2005 reflects this fact. Also, CAS 2005 indicates that grievances are more or 
less overlapped with race and incomes too. Yet, when regression analyses are conducted, race 
still has significant correlation with participation in civil society. This is in line with the 
discussion in Chapter 1 on the persistence of racial identity in the Western Cape. Indeed, 
when asked the racial composition of the organisations they were participating in, half the 
respondents answered they were from the same racial group. Black people are most likely to 
participate in associational activities, and one can assume that this is because black people 
have more organisational resources and traditions of association and defiance. This could be 
the evidence for ethnic sectionalism of civil society, which works only for black people, but 
more study is required to confirm the truth. Political attitudes are also consistently correlated 
with participation in civil society. As the qualitative data portrayed in the former chapter, 
CAS 2005 also shows the importance of politics in civil society. From these quantitative data, 
we can infer that civil society could reflect and reproduce many of racialised or politicised 
views or prejudice, even though civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a 













   Model A  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Relative income 
0 ‐ 2 (very poor)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
3 ‐ 4 (poor)  ‐  ‐.07 (.02)***  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
5 (average)  ‐  ‐.06 (.03)**  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
6 ‐ 7 (rich)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Self‐reported Social class 
Lower class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Working class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Middle class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Monthly household income 
R0 ‐ 1,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐.07 (.02)**  ‐ 
R1,001 ‐ 3,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐.08 (.03)***  ‐ 
R3,001 ‐ R5,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐.07 (.02)**  ‐ 
R5,001 ‐ 10,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
Neighbour income quintile 
NIQ1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ2  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
Demographics 
Female  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Black  .09 (.03)***  .08 (.03)***  .08 (.03)***  .13 (.04)***  .08 (.03)*** 
Age  <.01 (<.01)***  <.01 (<.01)***  <.01 (<.01)***  <.01 (<.01)***  <.01 (<.01)*** 
No work  ‐.05 (.02)***  ‐.05 (.02)***  ‐.05 (.02)**  Not sig  ‐.04 (.02)** 
Attitude towards neighbourhood 
Neighbours can be trusted 
(values from 1 to 5)  .02 (.01)***  .02 (.01)***  .02 (.01)**  Not sig  .02 (.01)** 
Political attitudes 
Political party  .15 (.05)***  .14 (.05)***  .17 (.06)***  .18 (.06)***  .15 (.05)*** 
Psychological resources 
Can get together and make 
elected leaders listen  .17 (.04)***  .15 (.04)***  .18 (.05)***  .20 (.05)***  .18 (.05)*** 
Can influence decisions by 
the city a lot  .07 (.03)***  .06 (.03)**  .07 (.03)**  .07 (.04)**  .07 (.03)*** 
High control in life  .06 (.01)***  .06 (.01)***  .06 (.01)***  .07 (.02)***  .06 (.01)*** 
Grievances 
Neighbourhood problems 
(values from 0 to 7)  .01 (<.01)**  .01 (<.01)***  .01 (<.01)**  Not sig  .01 (<.01)*** 
Service delivery grievances 
(values from 0 to 9)  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Political grievances 
(composite)  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Pseudo R2  0.26  0.27  0.27  0.28  0.27 
N  849  845  835  680  849 
Notes:    These  are  all  ‘dprobit’  regressions,  and  the  coefficients  reported  are  dF/dx.  Standard  errors  in  brackets. 
















   Model B  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Relative income 
0 ‐ 2 (very poor)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
3 ‐ 4 (poor)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
5 (average)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
6 ‐ 7 (rich)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Self‐reported Social class 
Lower class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Working class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Middle class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Monthly household income 
R0 ‐ 1,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  .23 (.08)***  ‐ 
R1,001 ‐ 3,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
R3,001 ‐ R5,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
R5,001 ‐ 10,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
Neighbour income quintile 
NIQ1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ2  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  .14 (.06)** 
Demographics 
Female  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Black  .12 (.04)***  .13 (.04)***  .11 (.04)***  Not sig  .11 (.05)** 
Political attitudes 
Political party  .25 (.07)***  .26 (.07)***  .25 (.07)***  .26 (.07)***  .26 (.07)*** 
Pay attention to politics  .13 (.04)***  .13 (.04)***  .13 (.04)***  .14 (.05)***  .14 (.04)*** 
Vote (values from 0 to 2)  .09 (.02)***  .09 (.02)***  .10 (.02)***  .11 (.03)***  .09 (.02)*** 
Religious attitude 
Religious organisation  .12 (.03)***  .12 (.03)***  .11 (.03)***  .12 (.04)***  .12 (.03)*** 
Grievances 
Neighbourhood problems 
(values from 0 to 7)  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Service delivery grievances 
(values from 0 to 9)  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Political grievances (composite)  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Pseudo R2  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.12 
N  865  862  847  680  865 

















   Model C  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
Relative income 
Very poor (0‐2)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Poor (3‐4)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Average (5)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Rich (6‐7)  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Self‐reported Social class 
Lower class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Working class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Middle class  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐  ‐ 
Monthly household income 
R0 ‐ 1,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
R1,001 ‐ 3,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
R3,001 ‐ R5,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
R5,001 ‐ 10,000  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig  ‐ 
Neighbour income quintile 
NIQ1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  .17 (.09)** 
NIQ2  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
NIQ4  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  Not sig 
Demographics 
Female  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Black  .09 (.04)**  .09 (.04)**  .11 (.05)**  Not sig  Not sig 
Coloured  .10 (.04)***  .11 (.04)***  .09 (.04)**  Not sig  Not sig 
Living length (values from 1 to 5)  .03 (.01)**  .03 (.01)**  .03 (.01)**  .03 (.01)**  .03 (.01)** 
Political attitudes 
Politics is important  .06 (.03)**  .06 (.03)**  .07 (.03)**  .07 (.04)**  .06 (.03)** 
Religious attitude 
Religious organisation  .06 (.02)***  .06 (.02)***  .06 (.02)**  .08 (.03)***  .07 (.02)*** 
Psychological resources 
Can get together and make 
elected leaders listen  .09 (.04)***  .09 (.04)***  .09 (.04)***  .09 (.04)**  .09 (.04)*** 
Grievances 
Neighbourhood problems  













Political grievances (composite)  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig  Not sig 
Pseudo R2  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.09  0.13 
N  864  859  851  685  864 
Notes:  These are all ‘dprobit’ regressions, and the coefficients reported are dF/dx. Standard errors in brackets. 

















Civil society is often parochial, because it is usually local and rooted in grass-roots issues and 
participation. Sometimes it works to benefit a specific ethnic group or political group, and 
also reflects some unsatisfactory aspects of culture to which the constituents of civil society 
belong. Both qualitative and quantitative data in this study show that the associational 
activities and social movements in Cape Town reflect some of the pathologies or injustices of 
the wider society. The ‘toilet war’ surely has an aspect of “service delivery protest”, where 
the poor and the marginalised undertake protest action to express their grievances for the 
improvement of service delivery. Nevertheless, the data shows that the “poorest of the poor” 
are actually excluded and deserted by democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, 
and the rage against the legacy of apartheid. Ironically enough, they are marginalised because 
democracy works so well that the voices of the majority are heard in the small community. 
The political conspiracy and the pride of black people also blind the residents to the poorest 
in the community. 
 
On the other hand, the quantitative analysis shows that participation in associational activities 
and protests is more correlated with variables such as race, political attitudes, and 
psychological resources than incomes or grievances. This is particularly true with 
associational activities like being a member of community-based groups or attending 
community meetings. From the results we can infer that people do not necessarily participate 
in civil society because of their grievances or poorness. High correlation with race and 
politics implies that associational activities and protests are racially and politically biased. 
There are several possible reasons why black people are more actively involved in civil 
society than other races. They could have more resources and opportunity to associate with 
each other, or share the tradition of defiance. The legacy of apartheid might make the bond 
amongst black people strong. The situation would be different in other parts of South Africa, 













Even when civil society is parochial, it should not lead to conflict if it does not exclude the 
interests of others. Nonetheless, in the context of post-apartheid South Africa and in some 
discourse of development, it is taken for granted too often that “community” or “civil society” 
represents the interests of the poor entirely and works as a safety net for them. We always 
have to examine whose interests each part of civil society represents. Civil society is only one 
part of society, and it can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices in the 
wider society. Policy makers should not justify their policies only because the “community” 
or “civil society” agreed with them. You have to carefully watch the structures of the 
community and civil society, and make sure that the poorest of the poor, who are the most 
vulnerable and need to be helped, are taken into account. Especially under the recent neo-
liberal policies implemented in South Africa, the government thoughtlessly entrusts its tasks 
to the private sector such as NPOs, companies and even citizens, without looking at the 
interests of the poorest of the poor. We must bear in mind that they can easily be 
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Variables  Frequency  Percentage  Question No. 
A member of community‐based groups  124  11%  D1.1_C & D1.2_C 
Attended community meetings  391  33%  D39 
Attended protest action  167  14%  D42, D44 & D45 
Female  739  62%  G4 
Black Africans  408  36%  F5 
Coloured  478  42%  F5 
White  252  22%  F5 
Head of household  771  65%  G1 
Not working  629  53%  G11 
Living length (less than a year)  61  5%  D16 
Living length (1 to 5 years)  226  19%  D16 
Living length (6 to 10 years)  224  19%  D16 
Living length (more than 10 years)  627  52%  D16 
Living length (since birth)  63  5%  D16 
Neighbourhood is "very important"  802  67%  B3.7 
Neighbourhood can be trusted 1  56  5%  D13 
Neighbourhood can be trusted 2  247  22%  D13 
Neighbourhood can be trusted 3   262  23%  D13 
Neighbourhood can be trusted 4  447  39%  D13 
Neighbourhood can be trusted 5  125  11%  D13 
Politics is "very important"  241  20%  B3.4 
A member of political parties  96  8%  D1.1_B & D1.2_B 
Pay attention to politics "most of the time"  273  24%  C2 
Vote index 0  331  29%  C26 & C45 
Vote index 1  396  34%  C26 & C45 
Vote index 2  432  37%  C26 & C45 
Religion is "very important"  1037  87%  B3.9 
A member of religious organisations  648  59%  D1.1_A & D1.2_A 
Can get together and make elected leaders listen  141  13%  C20 
Can influence decisions by the city "a lot"  167  16%  C22 
High control in life  1032  85%  B2.2 
Drunks, vagrants or beggars  759  64%  D22.1 
Homes broken into  746  64%  D22.2 
Cars broken into or stolen  651  56%  D22.3 












Gangs  323  36%  D22.5 
Noisy neighbours or parties  613  51%  D22.6 
Minibus taxi  548  53%  C32 
Electricity  264  22%  C28 
Water  257  22%  C29 
Public health clinics or hospitals  657  58%  C30 
Bus and train  493  48%  C31 
Police  456  40%  C33 
Road repairs and construction  458  39%  C34 
Housing  637  55%  C35 
Refuse collection  272  23%  C36 
No flush toilet in house  250  21%  G23 
President Mbeki performs badly  158  14%  C10 
Premier Rasool performs badly  60  7%  C11 
Mayor Mfeketo performs badly  70  10%  C41 
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1. Except for income variables 
       comPG     0.0230  -0.0126   0.0195   0.0879   0.0429   0.0409  -0.0643   0.0478   0.1121   0.0327   0.1198   0.1064  -0.0410  -0.0042   0.0729   0.1594   1.0000
        SDGI     0.0496   0.2965  -0.0950  -0.1786  -0.0279  -0.1293  -0.0268   0.0608   0.1208   0.0397   0.0696   0.0660   0.0578  -0.1157   0.3945   1.0000
         NPI    -0.0104   0.1901   0.0711  -0.1768  -0.0328   0.0435  -0.1820   0.0026   0.1592  -0.0516   0.1219   0.0144  -0.0493  -0.0874   1.0000
 highcontrol     0.0124  -0.1026   0.0319   0.0458  -0.0599  -0.0243   0.0934  -0.0137  -0.0394  -0.0150  -0.0552  -0.0083  -0.0132   1.0000
   influence    -0.0215   0.3059  -0.1545  -0.0344   0.0654  -0.0448   0.0739   0.3268   0.1041   0.1385   0.1288   0.2411   1.0000
    together    -0.0298   0.1136  -0.0218  -0.0109  -0.0457   0.0180  -0.0748   0.2325  -0.0272   0.1132   0.0892   1.0000
   religious     0.1080   0.1327  -0.0106   0.0649  -0.0005  -0.0158   0.0275   0.1112   0.1851   0.0550   1.0000
   attention    -0.1050   0.0130  -0.0644   0.1184  -0.0588   0.0362   0.0419   0.2530   0.0864   1.0000
  politicalp    -0.0314   0.2686  -0.1594   0.0158   0.0113  -0.0311   0.0831   0.2304   1.0000
      polimp    -0.0750   0.1759  -0.1002   0.0870   0.0313  -0.0276   0.0265   1.0000
  neightrust    -0.0343   0.0962  -0.2994   0.1173  -0.0238  -0.0870   1.0000
      living     0.0528  -0.2641   0.2560   0.2018   0.0385   1.0000
      nowork     0.1202   0.1423  -0.0612   0.1313   1.0000
         age    -0.0048  -0.3056   0.0426   1.0000
    coloured    -0.0261  -0.6339   1.0000
       black     0.0581   1.0000
      female     1.0000
                                                                                                                                                                       












2. Income variables and grievances 
 
 
         PGI     0.0382  -0.0293   0.0505   0.0292   0.0233  -0.0408   0.0735   0.0399   0.0090   0.0229   0.0602   0.1777   1.0000
        SDGI     0.3031  -0.1563   0.2305   0.0490   0.1820  -0.0157   0.1056   0.1377   0.2685  -0.0690   0.3322   1.0000
         NPI     0.1362   0.0643   0.1573   0.0320   0.1089   0.0529   0.0529   0.1053   0.1315   0.0628   1.0000
        NIQ2     0.1338   0.0280  -0.0193   0.0494   0.0455   0.0558   0.0688   0.0822  -0.3085   1.0000
        NIQ1     0.5664  -0.3541   0.2626  -0.0598   0.3825  -0.1390  0.2581   0.1737   1.0000
  mhhincome2     0.2225  -0.0316   0.1160   0.1573   0.2116   0.0131  -0.3431   1.0000
  mhhincome1     0.2840  -0.1271   0.1899  -0.1046   0.2915  -0.2108   1.0000
     working    -0.1067   0.2161  -0.1254   0.1360  -0.5348   1.0000
       lower     0.4555  -0.2305   0.3630  -0.0136   1.0000
  relincome2    -0.0426   0.0902  -0.3012   1.0000
  relincome1     0.2577  -0.1256   1.0000
    coloured    -0.7001   1.0000
       black     1.0000
                                                                                                                                   
                  black coloured relinc~1 relinc~2    lower  working mhhinc~1 mhhinc~2     NIQ1     NIQ2      NPI     SDGI      PGI
